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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON NON-
PROFIT VULNERABILITY, LEGITIMACY 
AND REGULATION 
Dr. Oonagh B. Breen* 
The ability of an NGO to govern itself free of outside interference is 
not—any more than the right to freedom of association—absolute—but 
any restrictions imposed must have a legal basis, serve a legitimate 
purpose and not be disproportionate in their effect. Some admissible re-
strictions are expressly recognised in international standards and others 
may be inferred from them.1 
his Article reviews European institutional efforts to develop a Eu-
ropean regulatory framework for non-profit organizations and 
chronicles the motivations for this new endeavour on the part of the Eu-
ropean Union (“EU” or the “Union”). Set initially against a background 
of concerns over terrorism financing, the EU’s interest in regulation of 
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)2 has expanded beyond the 
remit of counter-terrorism measures to include greater scrutiny of non-
profits under the heading of accountability and transparency. This Article 
explores the tensions inherent in the roll-out of any pan-European legis-
lative agenda, which are magnified in the case of the non-profit sector 
given the varying legal definitions of charitable and public benefit enti-
ties, the regional differences in the supervision of such entities, the ab-
sence of a point of reference for exchange of learning and experience at a 
                                                                                                                                     
 * Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University College Dublin. oon-
agh.breen@ucd.ie. The author is grateful to Dana Brakman Reiser, Claire Kelly, Mark 
Sidel, and other participants in the Dennis J. Block Center for International Business Law 
and Brooklyn Journal of International Law Symposium—Governing Civil Society: NGO 
Accountability, Legitimacy and Influence—for their valuable comments. 
 1. Council of Europe, Expert Council on NGO Law, Second Annual Report: The 
Internal Governance of Non-Governmental Organisations, ¶ 17, OINGConf/Exp. 1/2010 
1 (Jan. 2010). 
 2. This Article uses the terms non-profit organization (“NPO”) and non-
governmental organization (“NGO”) interchangeably. In general, the European Commis-
sion also uses both terms. In the past, the Commission seemed to favour the NGO con-
cept. See, e.g., The Commission and NGOs: Building a Stronger Partnership, COM 
(2000) 11 final (Jan. 18, 2000) (a Commission Discussion Paper which sought to suggest 
ways of providing a more coherent Commission-wide framework for co-operation with 
NGOs that had hitherto been organised on a sector-by-sector basis). More recently, in the 
development of its guidelines to prevent use of NGOs for terrorist financing purposes, the 
Commission has switched from NGO to NPO terminology. The Prevention of and Fight 
Against Terrorism Financing Through Enhanced National Level Coordination and 
Greater Transparency of the Non-profit Sector, COM (2005) 620 final (Nov. 29, 2005). 
T
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transnational level within the EU, and the operational distance between 
agencies charged with NGO supervision, financial crime regulation, and 
counter-terrorism security. 
Part I outlines the international call for better non-profit regulation in 
the wake of 9/11 and the universal problems experienced in giving full 
effect to that call. Part II then considers the particular historical and legal 
difficulties that the EU has experienced in legislating for non-profit or-
ganizations in the past. Part III moves on to review European efforts to 
implement the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) Special Recom-
mendations. In this regard, the Article looks at the 2005 Communication 
on the Prevention of and Fight Against Terrorist Financing through En-
hanced National Level Coordination and Greater Transparency of the 
Non-Profit Sector, promulgated by the European Commission (the 
“Commission”), and how it attempted to introduce a regulatory (albeit 
‘voluntary’) regime for charities and the non-profit reaction to these 
Commission initiatives. 
Part IV turns its attention to the EU’s re-assessment of its counterter-
rorism strategy in the context of non-profit organizations in light of three 
important reports carried out between 2007 and 2009. These reports, 
though coming from different perspectives, make a common point re-
garding non-profit regulation: the best European regulation is based on 
empirical evidence of abuse, is proportional to the perceived wrong, and 
is sensitive both to existing national regimes and to the flexibility that 
humanitarian organizations, in particular, require to carry out their mis-
sions in areas of high risk. Part V reviews the Commission’s most recent 
foray in the area of non-profit regulation with the release of its Discus-
sion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines for EU-based non-profit organiza-
tions. It outlines the challenges facing the European Commission as it 
works towards the publication of its proposed Communication on Volun-
tary Guidelines for EU-based Non-profit Organizations in 2011 and how 
these challenges are likely to affect international non-profits’ delivery of 
their charitable missions within and without the European Union. 
Part VI concludes that the current institutional passion for combating 
the financing of terrorism appears set to be the driving influence behind 
the proposed European regulation of non-profit organizations. It is sub-
mitted that a more balanced approach, which would still speak to the 
prevention of terrorism, would be to focus on improving non-profit gov-
ernance in those areas that raise concern at EU level or that may particu-
larly benefit from a concerted European (as opposed to an ad hoc Mem-
ber State) policy solution. In this context the contrasting regulatory expe-
riences of the United States Department of the Treasury (with its focus 
on the enforcement of anti-terrorist financing guidelines) and the Council 
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of Europe’s Expert Council on NGO Law (with its focus on internal 
NGO governance) are briefly set out as diverging policy options for the 
European Commission’s consideration. 
I. THE BACKDROP TO EUROPEAN REGULATION 
In October 2001, the FATF, in response to 9/11, issued nine special 
recommendations on terrorist financing. Special Recommendation 
(“SR”) VIII focuses on the activities of non-profit organizations and re-
quires that: 
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that re-
late to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-
profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should 
ensure that they cannot be misused: 
• by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; 
• to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financ-
ing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing 
measures; and 
• to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds in-
tended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.”3 
The FATF SR VIII created a political climate in which it was seen as 
unacceptable for a signatory state to have ineffective laws overseeing 
non-profit activity in the context of combating terrorist financing.4 In his 
book, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies,5 John Kingdon identi-
fies the prerequisites for effective policy change as being the conver-
gence of three streams, namely, a recognised and existing “problem,” an 
available and waiting “solution,” and the necessary catalytic “political 
climate” to force problem and solution together through an open policy 
                                                                                                                                     
 3. Financial Action Task Force [FATF] & Groupe d’Action Financière [GAFI], 
FATF IX Special Recommendations, at 3 (Oct. 2001). 
 4. See G8 Finance Ministers’ Statement at Deauville, (May 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/fonds_documentaire/archives/communiques/2003/c0305192_a
ngl.htm; see also G8 Justice & Home Affairs Ministers, Recommendations for Enhancing 
the Legal Framework to Prevent Terrorist Attacks (May 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/g82004/G8_Recs_Legal_Frameworks_Preven
t_Terrorism.pdf; Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Council Declaration on the 
EU Response to the London Bombings (July 13, 2005) [hereinafter London Bombings 
Press Release], available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st11/st11116.en05.pdf. 
 5. JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (Eric Stano ed., 
2d ed. 2003). 
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window thereby creating policy change.6 When a policy window opens, 
in the words of Kingdon, “participants dump their conceptions of prob-
lems, their proposals, and political forces into the choice opportunity, 
and the outcomes depend on the mix of elements present and how the 
various elements are coupled.”7 In other words, prevailing circumstances 
affect policy outcomes in so far as they influence our conceptions of both 
the problem and the likely solution. Identifying those prevailing circum-
stances can thus help us better understand resulting policy outcomes that 
emerge. 
The FATF Special Recommendations seized upon the catalytic event 
that was the political turmoil following the 9/11 terrorist attacks to open 
a new policy window in respect of non-profit regulation. Finding the cor-
rect ‘solution’ to push through that window has not proven easy. To a 
large degree, there is lack of agreement as to the nature of the ‘problem,’ 
making it all the more difficult to arrive at a consensual solution. Poli-
cymakers may argue that public security and the wider public interest 
demand greater regulatory oversight of charities post 9/11 due to their 
perceived vulnerability to abuse through terrorist financing. Non-profits 
may concede the argument in favour of regulation if two conditions are 
met—first, the reality of the perceived threat is supported by empirical 
evidence; second, the measures are proportional to the likelihood of the 
alleged threat occurring. As yet, there has been no meeting of the minds 
on these all important issues of threat and proof. 
The recent pace of regulatory change in NGO governing legislation in 
a number of FATF member states, however, would seem to imply a will-
ingness by national governments to take action.8 Undoubtedly, the close 
scrutiny of states’ progress via FATF mutual evaluation reports has put 
                                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 88. 
 7. Id. at 166. 
 8. Reference in this regard can be made to the Charities and Trustee Investment 
(Scotland) Act, 2005, (A.S.P. 10), the Charities Act, 2006, c. 50 (Eng.), the Charities Act 
(Northern Ireland), 2008, c. 12, and Charities Act, 2009 (Act No. 6/2009) (Ir.). Many of 
the newer EU member states have completely overhauled their non-profit regimes in 
recent years. Note, for instance, Poland’s introduction of its Law on Public Benefit Activ-
ity and Volunteerism, (Poland), 2003; Law on Non-Profit Legal Entities, (Bulgaria), 
Amendment 2006, SG No105/22.12.2006 (2006); and Estonia’s Non-Profit Association 
Act, (Estonia), 1996, Amendment 2006, RT I 2005 and its 2005 amendments to Founda-
tions Act 1995, Foundation Act (Estonia), 1995, Amended 2005, RT I 2004. More spo-
radic change is evident amongst older EU continental member states. See, e.g., Belgium’s 
La Loi de L’Association Sans But Lucratif, (Belgium), Amended 2002.; Spain’s Founda-
tion Law 2002; and Finland’s Foundation Law (Finland), 109/31, Amended 248/2001. 
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pressure on states to act.9 The FATF has an oversight ally in the form of 
the United Nation’s (“UN”) Counter Terrorism Committee, which, in 
furtherance of Security Council Resolution 1373 (imposing binding obli-
gations on all states to adopt a series of counterterrorism measures), 
monitors the extent to which states have the necessary laws and regula-
tions in place to ensure that charities and other non-profits are not being 
used to finance or otherwise support terrorism.10 There is thus great em-
phasis on the need for new or revised non-profit regulation. The form 
that this regulation should take, however, has proved more difficult to 
devise. A related area, yet to be tackled by legislators and policymakers 
alike, is the acceptable impact of any such measures on non-profit organ-
izations and their missions.11 
                                                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., FATF & GAFI, Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti Money Launder-
ing and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: UK and Northern Ireland, at 244 (June 
29, 2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/29/39064399.pdf, awarding 
the UK a “largely compliant” rating for SR VIII on the basis that at the time Northern 
Ireland’s legislation did not cover the registration, transparency, and supervision of chari-
ties. Ireland received a “partially compliant” rating from the FATF on the basis that “Ire-
land is in the process of completing a review of its NPO sector, but has not yet imple-
mented measures to ensure accountability and transparency in the sector so that terrorist 
organisations cannot pose as legitimate non profit organisations, or to ensure that 
funds/assets collected by or transferred through non-profit organisations are not diverted 
to support the activities of terrorists or terrorist organisations.” See FATF & GAFI, Third 
Mutual Evaluation Report Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Ter-
rorism: Ireland, at 135 (Feb. 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.antimoneylaundering.gov.ie/en/AML/FATF-
Third_mutual_eval.pdf/Files/FATF-Third_mutual_eval.pdf. In a subsequent follow-up 
report on the UK in 2009, the FATF recognised that the United Kingdom had made sig-
nificant progress in addressing deficiencies identified in the 2007 Report to be removed 
from the regular follow-up process and agreed that it should henceforth report on a bien-
nial basis. 
 10. In Ireland’s case, a United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Commit-
tee requested that Ireland review and update its charity legislation amid fears that chari-
ties set up in Ireland could be abused. This was the political driver that prioritised the 
enactment of new charity regulation. See S.C. Res. 816, U.N. Doc. S/Res/816 (Aug. 18, 
2003); see also, 589 Dáil Deb. Col. 3 (Oct. 5, 2004). New Zealand’s legislative efforts 
culminating in the Charities Act 2005 stemmed from a similar UN request to that coun-
try. See Security: New Zealand Response to the United Nations Security Council Coun-
ter-Terrorism Committee, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (April 30, 2004), 
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/International-Security/0-NZ-
UN-Counter-Terrorism-April-04.php. 
 11. ERIC ROSAND, ALISTAIR MILLAR, & JASON IPE, CTR. ON GLOBAL 
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (Sept. 2008). 
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In its 2002–2003 Annual Report, the FATF, noting the level of mem-
ber non-compliance with SR VIII, recognized the complexity of the is-
sues involved and the need for further guidance.12 In an effort to facilitate 
better implementation of SR VIII, the FATF issued a Best Practices Pa-
per in 200213 and a subsequent Interpretative Note in 2006.14 The Best 
Practices Paper highlighted the need for governments to focus their over-
sight of non-profit organizations in the core areas of a) financial trans-
parency; b) programme verification; and c) administration.15 The Inter-
pretative Note, issued four years later, reflects the continuing difficulties 
experienced by member states in giving tangible effect to SR VIII.16 To 
this end, it reiterates the general objectives of SR VIII and the general 
principles for compliance. In particular, it focuses on the need for coun-
tries to a) engage with non-profit organizations through appropriate out-
reach to the sector; b) promote effective oversight and monitoring of 
such organizations; c) undertake effective investigation and information 
gathering; and d) put in place appropriate mechanisms for international 
cooperation.17 Notwithstanding these clarifications, uncertainties of ap-
plication still remain.18 FATF members, amongst which are fifteen of the 
EU’s Member States and the European Commission,19 still experience 
                                                                                                                                     
 12. FAFT & GAFI, Annual Report 2002–2003, ¶ 28 (June 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/13/0/34328221.pdf (noting that “[w]ith regard to as-
sessing compliance levels for SR VIII, FATF members continue to consider the best way 
to accomplish this task taken into account the best practices paper issued by FATF on this 
subject in October 2002. The FATF is likely to continue examining appropriate assess-
ment criteria in the context of development of further guidance on this recommenda-
tion.”). 
 13. FATF & GAFI, Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations: International 
Best Practices (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organiza-
tions], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/53/53/34260889.pdf. 
 14. FATF & GAFI, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VIII: Non-Profit 
Organisations (Feb. 2006) [hereinafter Interpretative Note to SR VIII], available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530.pdf. 
 15. Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations, supra note 13. 
 16. Interpretative Note to SR VIII, supra note 14. 
 17. Id. ¶ 6. 
 18. Mark Pieth, Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
1074, 1075 (2006) (observing that the distinction between charitable functions and the 
support of guerrilla warfare is not easy, a problem unresolved by the Interpretative Note 
to Special Recommendation VIII). 
 19. Newer members of the European Union who are not members of the FATF are 
currently members of the Council of Europe’s Moneyval process. Comprising twenty-
eight permanent members and two temporary members, Moneyval obtained associate 
member status of the FATF in January 2006, having previously enjoyed observer status. 
Within the FATF, Moneyval is viewed as a FATF style regional body (“FSRB”). 
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difficulties with SR VIII and are unable to agree on a common approach 
to its implementation to date.20 
The difficulties experienced in a European context stem in part from 
the fact that the EU has not played a regulatory role in the past in regard 
to non-profit organizations. The reasons for this regulatory void are best 
attributed to a combination of historical and legal factors, discussed be-
low.21 Whether the policy window that has now opened as a result of the 
FATF SRs will enable the EU to overcome this regulatory void is an 
open question. Much will depend upon whether the prevailing circum-
stances, linked as they are to anti-terrorist concerns, will be influential 
enough to overcome the past legal and historical obstacles and result in 
the development of an appropriate policy solution. 
II. THE MANDATE FOR REGULATORY REVIEW 
Historically, the Treaty of Rome was silent on the role of non-profit 
organizations under EU law. For almost fifty years, the only express ref-
erence to non-profit organizations in the Articles of the Rome Treaty was 
a negative one. Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (“TFEU”) expressly excludes non-profit bodies based in one 
Member State from the right to establish in the territory of another Mem-
ber State, a right that is enjoyed by for-profit companies and EU work-
ers.22 This difference in treatment highlights the EU’s preference for fa-
                                                                                                                                     
 20. For the comments of the European Commission in this regard, conceding to such 
difficulties, see Commission of the European Communities, The Prevention of and Fight 
Against Terrorist Financing through Enhanced National Level Coordination and Greater 
Transparency of the Non-Profit Sector, at 9, COM (2005) 620 final (Nov. 29, 2005) 
[hereinafter Commission Communication (2005) 620 final]; see also Eur. Comm’n, Di-
rectorate-General Justice Freedom & Security, Independent Scrutiny in Response to Rec-
ommendation 41 of the EU Counter Terrorist Financing Strategy to Assess the EU’s 
Efforts in the Fight against Terrorist Financing: Final Report, 5 (2007) [hereinafter In-
dependent Scrutiny Report]. The report noted that in the context of the FATF Special 
Recommendations, “there are still problems with regard to definitions of terrorism . . . 
and a consensus on policy towards NPOs (SRVIII) is still to be reached.” Id. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. Article 54 of the TFEU provides: “Companies or firms formed in accordance with 
the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States. ‘Compa-
nies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, in-
cluding cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, 
save for those which are non-profit-making.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union art.54, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 69 [hereinaf-
ter TFEU]. 
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cilitating economic actors within the EU. For a Treaty founded on eco-
nomic interests and corresponding trade rights, which created a commu-
nity for many years known as the “European Economic Community,” 
this initial disregard for non-profit bodies is unsurprising.23 
It was not until 2000, with the ratification of the Treaty of Nice, that a 
specific reference to “civil society” first appeared in the governing provi-
sions of the Treaty.24 The Nice Treaty amended Article 257 TEC to in-
clude reference to “organised civil society” as one of the constituent 
groupings to be represented by the Economic and Social Committee, thus 
giving non-profit organizations an indirect (though largely ineffective) 
voice in European affairs.25 More recently, the Treaty of Lisbon paid fur-
ther lip service to the important role that civil society organisations play 
in European democracy,26 yet even this fleeting reference is a watered 
down version of earlier draft provisions that attempted to formalise insti-
tutional interaction with civil society organizations.27 From a constitu-
                                                                                                                                     
 23. See Case C-70/95, Sodemare SA v. Regione Lombardia, 1997 3 C.M.L.R. 591, 
604 (noting that “[Article 54 TFEU] . . . has the function of assimilating companies, firms 
and other legal persons, other than those which are non-profit-making (hereinafter nor-
mally referred to as “commercial companies”), to natural persons who are nationals of 
Member States, for the purposes of freedom of establishment. Thus, non-profit-making 
companies, firms and other legal persons do not benefit from freedom of establish-
ment.”). 
 24. Between 1957 and 2000 there were protocols to various Amending Treaties that 
did refer to charities and non-profit organizations such as Declaration 23 of the Treaty on 
European Union (“The Conference stresses the importance, in pursuing the objectives of 
Article 117 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, of cooperation between 
the latter and charitable associations and foundations as institutions responsible for social 
welfare establishments and services.” Treaty on European Union, Declaration 23, July 
29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191)) and Declaration 38 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (“The Con-
ference recognises the important contribution made by voluntary service activities to 
developing social solidarity. The Community will encourage the European dimension of 
voluntary organisations with particular emphasis on the exchange of information and 
experiences as well as on the participation of the young and the elderly in voluntary 
work.” Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Es-
tablishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Declaration 38, Oct. 2, 
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)). These declarations, however, had no legal basis in European 
law, and thus do not provide a source of legal rights to such organizations. 
 25. See Article 300 of the TFEU, introduced upon the ratification of the Nice Treaty, 
which makes specific reference to “civil society” and its right of representation within the 
European Economic and Social Committee. TFEU art. 300. 
 26. See Article 15 of the TFEU, promising a level of transparency and openness in 
the operation of the Union’s institutions so as to “promote good governance and ensure 
the participation of civil society.” Id. art. 15. 
 27. Earlier draft provisions required European institutions to “maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.” The 
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tional perspective, therefore, the European approach towards non-profit 
organizations has progressed from a negative to a superficially positive 
attitude. 
In practice, European institutions have adopted a functional approach 
towards non-profits. The European Court of Justice has found non-profits 
to be subject to community law in areas ranging from labour law28 to 
competition law,29 and recent case law confirms that non-profit organiza-
tions enjoy the same rights under the Treaties as for-profit entities in re-
lation to the free movement of capital between Member States.30 With 
regard to Community legislative competence, as long ago as 1987, the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights of the European Par-
liament suggested three potential Treaty bases that could provide Com-
munity competence over non-profit organizations.31 The utility of these 
various Treaty provisions has been somewhat mixed. 
Article 18 TFEU, with its focus on prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of nationality, has provided the European Court of Justice (the 
“ECJ”) with an indirect and limited means of reviewing national laws 
that discriminate against certain member-based non-profit associations.32 
The use of Articles 114 TFEU and 352 TFEU as legislative bases has 
                                                                                                                                     
ratified version of Lisbon (Article 19 TFEU), however, limited this more specific promise 
of engagement to churches and religious organizations. Id. art. 19. 
 28. Case C-29/91, Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Hendrikus Bartol, 1992 E.C.R. I-
3189 (holding that functionally there was nothing to prevent the application of the Di-
rective on the Transfer of Undertakings to non-profits on the transfer of their employees). 
 29. The European Court of Justice has held that the non-profit-making nature of the 
entity in question or the fact that it seeks non-commercial objectives is irrelevant for the 
purposes of defining it as an “undertaking” for the purposes of the application of Europe-
an competition law. See Case C-244/94, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance, 
Société Paternelle-Vie, Union des Assurances de Paris-Vie and Caisse d’Assurance et de 
Prévoyance Mutuelle des Agriculteurs v. Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche, 1995 
E.C.R. I-4013, ¶ 21; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov Stichting Pensioenfonds 
Medische Specialisten, 2000 E.C.R. I-6451, ¶ 117. 
 30. See, e.g., Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt 
Munchen fur Korperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203; Case C-318/07, Hein Persche v. Fi-
nanzamt Lüdenscheid, 2009 E.C.R. I-359. 
 31. Eur. Communities & Eur. Parliament, Report on Non-Profit Making Associations 
in the European Community (Jan. 8, 1987) (by Nicole Fontaine) (citing Article 18 TFEU 
(ex Article 12 TEC); Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 95 TEC) and Article 352 TFEU (ex 
Article 308 TEC)). 
 32. Case C-172/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Belgium, 1999 
E.C.R. I-3999 (holding that Belgian laws that made the granting of legal personality to 
non-profit membership associations contingent on the presence of Belgian nationals in 
the organization or its governing structure breached Article 18 TFEU, which prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality). 
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proven more controversial. Article 352, while providing the broader ba-
sis for community action,33 requires unanimity within the European 
Council (the “Council”) for the successful passage of any regulation—a 
difficult feat with twenty-seven Member States involved. Article 114, on 
the other hand, has the advantage of requiring only a qualified majority 
vote within the Council but it is more limited in its use since it only ap-
plies to a narrower range of Council measures, most specifically 
“measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”34 The 
absence of a user-friendly legal basis for non-profit regulation at the EU 
level may thus be seen as a contributing factor to the lack of a proactive 
legislative agenda on the part of the Commission in the past. 
The Commission has also tended to emphasize the facilitative role 
played by NGOs in advancing the European agenda (a role greatly wel-
comed by the Commission),35 more so than any supervisory role that the 
Commission feels it should play in relation to these organizations. In its 
White Paper on European Governance, issued in July 2001, the Commis-
sion mentions the need for stronger NGO governance but sees its role as 
being to encourage such an outcome as opposed to regulate for it.36 Yet, 
                                                                                                                                     
 33. TFEU art. 352 (providing that “[i]f action by the Community should prove neces-
sary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives 
of the Community, [and this Treaty has] not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
[shall], acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission” and after consulting the 
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.”). 
 34. See Case C-436/03, European Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-3733 (deter-
mining whether the Regulation on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society was 
correctly adopted on the basis of Article 352 TFEU or whether Article 114 TFEU provid-
ed a more appropriate legal basis); see also Oonagh Breen, EU Regulation of Charitable 
Organizations: The Politics of Legally Enabling Civil Society, 10 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT L. 50, 63–64 (2008). 
 35. Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 14–15, COM (2001) 428 
final (July 25, 2001) (noting that “[n]on governmental organizations . . . often act as an 
early warning system for the direction of political debate . . . . This offers a real potential 
to broaden the debate on Europe’s role. It is a chance to get citizens more actively in-
volved in achieving the Union’s objectives and to offer them a structured channel for 
feedback, criticism and protest.”). 
 36. Id. at 15 (providing that “[w]ith better involvement comes greater responsibility. 
Civil society must itself follow the principles of good governance, which include ac-
countability and openness. The Commission intends to establish, before the end of this 
year, a comprehensive on-line database with details of civil society organisations active 
at European level, which should act as a catalyst to improve their internal organisation.”). 
This database, the Register of Interest Representatives, currently lists over 3,000 bodies, 
one-third of which are NGOs. See Register of Interest Representatives, EUR. COMM’N, 
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within a three-month period of the events of 9/11, the Commission’s in-
terests in regulating non-profits changed dramatically, in line with King-
donian prevailing circumstances. 
III. COMMUNICATION (2005) 620 
As a full member of the FATF, the EU has sought to give effect to the 
FATF Special Recommendations on the suppression of terrorist financ-
ing within the framework of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and 
the TEC. Such measures are additional to those measures taken by the 
EU’s respective Member States in fulfillment of their obligations under 
the FATF SRs and UN Resolution 1373/2001.37 The European Commis-
sion used the FATF Special Recommendations as a basis for combating 
terrorist financing at the EU level by establishing European Action Plans 
and enacting Framework Decisions.38 Spurred on by the Madrid and 
London bombings in 2004 and 2005, the European Council turned its 
attention to the regulation of non-profit organisations,39 which in turn 
                                                                                                                                     
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/consultation/search.do?reset= (last visit-
ed Apr. 7, 2011). 
 37. European Union Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee—Res 1373 (Dec. 
12, 2001), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1031_en.htm. 
 38. Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency: Co-ordination of Im-
plementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism, 12800/01 (Oct. 16, 2001), 
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st12/st12800.en01.pdf; Council 
of the European Union, Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), 
12156/01 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st12/st12156.en01.pdf; Council Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002/475/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L 164) 3 (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism]; Council of the European Union, 
European Union Action Plan to Combat Terrorism—Update of the Roadmap, 10773/2/02 
REV 2 (July 17, 2001); Council of the European Union, EU Plan of Action on Combating 
Terrorism, 10010/04 (June 1, 2004), available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st10/st10010.en04.pdf; Council of the Euro-
pean Union, The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 4 (Nov. 
30, 2005), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-
re04.en05.pdf (noting at paragraph twenty-nine that “tackling the misuse of the non-profit 
sector remains a priority. We must also ensure that financial investigation is an integral 
part of all terrorism investigations. These measures and others which build on the Finan-
cial Action Task Force’s recommendations, form part of the EU’s comprehensive strate-
gy for combating terrorist financing.”). 
 39. Council of the European Union, Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 7906/04 
(Mar. 29, 2004), available at 
http://register.consilium.europra.eu/pdf/en/04/st07/st07906.en04.pdf (issued after the 
Madrid bombings and committing the Commission to strengthening the accountability 
and transparency of charities and stating a European strategic objective as being to 
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informed the Commission’s policy statement on the implementation of 
the FATF’s SR VIII at European level in November 2005.40 Commission 
Communication (2005) 620 spoke to two issues—the need for enhanced 
national coordination by Member States and ‘relevant actors’41 in the 
exchange of information to cut off terrorist financing; and secondly, the 
need to address vulnerabilities of non-profit organizations to terrorist 
financing and other criminal abuse. 
In this latter regard, the Commission set out its European implementa-
tion strategy for SR VIII through a series of recommendations to Mem-
ber States and in a framework for a Code of Conduct for Non-profits to 
promote transparency and accountability best practices.42 Prior to the 
framework’s publication, the Commission issued a draft version for pub-
lic consultation in July 2005. The draft was not well received by the non-
profit sector from either a procedural or substantive perspective. Proce-
durally, in allowing initially for only a 6-week consultation window, the 
Commission breached its own Minimum Standards on Consultation of 
Interested Parties,43 which requires that consultations be open for at least 
an eight-week period, a breach much commented upon in the submis-
sions received.44 Even though the time was subsequently extended to 
eight weeks, the summer timing still rankled with respondents. 
                                                                                                                                     
“[d]evelop and implement an EU strategy on the suppression of terrorist financing, in-
cluding the regulation of charitable organisations and alternative remittance systems”); 
see also London Bombings Press Release supra note 4 (noting in response to the London 
bombing the Council’s determination to agree a code of conduct to prevent misuse of 
charities by terrorists by December 2005). 
 40. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 20. The Communica-
tion was issued after discussions at workshops organized by the Commission in October 
2004 and April 2005 and following public feedback in response to a public consultation 
on a draft recommendation and Code of Conduct. 
 41. These actors include government justice or treasury officials, Financial Intelli-
gence Units, specialized financial police, Public Prosecutor’s Offices, Customs Authori-
ties, Tax Revenue Services, intelligence services, financial regulators, and the Central 
Bank. 
 42. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 20, annex. 
 43. Communication from the Commission, Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consul-
tation and Dialogue—General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of 
Interested Parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. 11, 2002). 
 44. See Public Consultations, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0014_en.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011), for 
the responses of ActionAid International, the EU Civil Society Contact Group, and the 
Carmichael Centre for Voluntary Groups, Ireland, on this issue. This is not an isolated 
occurrence; non-profits again chided the Commission in July 2010 for the lack of ad-
vance notice to comment on its Discussion Paper on the voluntary guidelines. See also 
Hanneke de Bode, EU Non-profits and Counterterrorism Consultation: Your Opinions?, 
EUCLID NETWORK (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.euclidnetwork.eu/news.php/en/404/eu-
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Substantively, the inclusion of a list of ‘risk indicators’ to identify non-
profits involved in terrorist financing or other criminal purposes in the 
proposed Code of Conduct caused consternation for many NGOs.45 
Those indicators included such matters as: (a) the sharing of office space 
and legal or accountancy service providers; (b) the presence on the board 
of directors or trustees who hold positions with other non-profits; (c) a 
low ratio of employees to funds managed; and (d) the fact that funds dis-
tributed or collected fluctuated suddenly in amount.46 All of these were 
said to constitute risk factors pointing to criminality rather than efficient 
NGO administration. The Commission’s draft proposals regarding finan-
cial management risk factors also lacked coherency. It is a common EU 
Programme requirement (many of which are administered by the Com-
mission) that new bank accounts be established for each individual pro-
ject run and that separate financial and auditing records should be kept. 
Yet, for the purposes of its Code, the Commission had proposed that the 
holding of multiple banks accounts by an NGO would constitute a risk 
factor, as would a sudden change in the amount of funds disbursed or 
collected. 
The effect of this risk indicators list, according to respondents,47 would 
have been to confuse NGO operational efficiency measures with suspect 
terrorist/criminal activities. It did not go unnoticed by non-profits that the 
Commission’s first serious engagement in the regulation of the sector 
was one based not on facilitating the sector but rather suspicion of it.48 
                                                                                                                                     
non-profits-and-counterterrorism-consultation-your-opinions [hereinafter EUCLID 
NETWORK]. 
 45. See Eur. Comm’n, Draft Recommendations to Member States Regarding a Code 
of Conduct for Non-Profit Organisations to Promote Transparency and Accountability 
Best Practices, at 2, JLS/D2/DB/NSK D (2005) 8208 (July 22, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/consulting_public/0014/draft_recommendations_en.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 7–8. 
 47. For a complete list of the submissions received by the European Commission, see 
Public Consultations: Open Consultation on the Document “Draft Recommendations to 
Member States Regarding a Code of Conduct for Non-Profit Organisations to Promote 
Transparency and Accountability Best Practices,” EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/consulting_public/consulting_0014_en.htm (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
 48. Letter from Carmichael Ctr. for Voluntary Groups, Ireland, to Dir. Gen. Justice, 




s%20_ireland_en.pdf (noting that “[p]revious attempts by the sector to get EU-level 
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The final version of the Framework Code, published in 2005 as part of 
Commission Communication (2005) 620, omitted the risk indicators an-
nex entirely.49 
Communication (2005) 620 called on EU Member States to better 
oversee their non-profit sectors through maintaining/creating publicly 
accessible registration systems for all non-profits; to provide greater fi-
nancial transparency guidance to non-profits; and to encourage compli-
ance with the proposed Framework Code.50 Acknowledging that the pri-
mary purpose of the Communication was to prevent abuse of non-profits 
by terrorist financing, an ancillary hope of the Commission was that the 
proposed enhanced transparency and accountability measures would also 
help to protect organisations from other forms of criminal abuse.51 Not 
content to leave the initiative solely in the hands of Member States and 
non-profits, the Communication also provided that the Commission 
would consider further “whether in certain circumstances community 
funding of non-profits could be linked to compliance with enhanced 
transparency and accountability measures.”52 
The actual provisions of the Framework for the Code relate predomi-
nantly to the need for registration of non-profit organisations and the 
proper keeping of accounts.53 Although the Commission recognised the 
need for coordination amongst Member States in the Code’s operation, 
no guidance was given in the Communication as to how this could best 
be achieved;54 nor was there any consideration of how the additional 
                                                                                                                                     
recognition for NGOs and NPOs in the form of the European Statute of Association have 
not received similar attention from the European Commission. It is disappointing that this 
first stage to recognition is to take place based on suspicion of our sector rather than ap-
preciation for its potential to bring the EU closer to the citizen.”); see also Letter from 
CONCORD (Eur. NGO Confederation for Relief & Dev.), to Franco Frattini, Comm’r for 
Justice, Freedom & Security, Eur. Comm’n (Sept. 26, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/consulting_public/0014/contributions/concord_en.pdf (noting that “[f]rom 
the very legitimate concern to prevent financing from terrorism the Commission proposal 
has taken as a starting point NPOs as a problem that needs to be better controlled and 
regulated. We believe a more constructive approach would have been to see NPOs as a 
resource and reach out in a dialogue with civil society on what can be done and improved 
to curb this problem as much as possible.”). 
 49. See Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 20. 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. at 9. 
 52. Id. at 10. 
 53. See id. at 11–16. 
 54. Id. at 12 (“[T]he Recommendation and the Framework for a Code of Conduct 
should not in any way hinder legal cross border activities of NPOs. The aim of the Euro-
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Code requirements would affect existing national regulatory require-
ments. However, as part of its commitment to the implementation of 
Communication (2005) 620 at the European level, the Communication 
promised further Commission engagement with the non-profit sector on 
the proposed code. Specifically, it pledged to establish an informal con-
tact group in 2006 and to organize a conference with representatives of 
the non-profit sector and relevant authorities to consider further imple-
mentation of principles laid down in the Recommendation and Frame-
work for a Code of Conduct.55 
Following the publication of the Commission’s Communication, the 
European Council reaffirmed its commitment to a code of conduct and 
agreed on five key principles in relation to the future treatment of non-
profit organizations, recognizing that: 
• Safeguarding the integrity of the non-profit sector is a shared 
responsibility of states and non-profit organisations. 
• Dialogue between Member States, the non-profit sector and 
other relevant stakeholders is essential to build robust defenc-
es against terrorist finance. 
• Member States should continually develop their knowledge of 
their non-profit sector, its activities and vulnerabilities. 
• Transparency, accountability and good governance lie at the 
heart of donor confidence and probity in the non-profit sector. 
• Risks of terrorist finance are managed best where there are ef-
fective, proportionate measures for oversight.56 
Implementation of the Framework code to date has been sporadic. The 
Commission has organized three conferences on non-profit sector ac-
countability and transparency with the most recent occurring in July 
2010. Participation, however, is by Commission invitation only and no 
information on the conference or its deliberations are otherwise publicly 
available. The promised contact group, first mentioned in Commission 
                                                                                                                                     
pean approach is thus to establish common principles on which national implementation 
can be based.”). 
 55. Id. at 9. 
 56. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, 2696th Council Meeting: Justice and 
Home Affairs (Dec. 1–2, 2005), at 32, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/05/296&format=HTML
&aged=0&lg=sl&guiLanguage=en. 
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(2005) 620 and given further consideration by the Commission in 2006,57 
never materialised and the Commission formally abandoned the idea in 
October 2007. 
IV. THE REPORTING ERA: INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY, MATRIX AND 
EUROPEAN CENTER FOR NON-PROFIT LAW (“ECNL”) STUDIES 
In the past five years since the publication of Communication (2005) 
620, the EU has both reviewed and revised its broader counterterrorism 
strategy in the context of non-profit oversight. Three reports are worthy 
of mention in this regard; the first in 2007 assessing EU progress on its 
counter terrorist financing strategy in the implementation of the FATF 
special recommendations (“Independent Scrutiny Report, 2007”) and two 
later reports dealing respectively with the vulnerability of non-profits to 
financial crime (“Matrix Report, 2008”) and with public and self regula-
tory initiatives to improve non-profit transparency and accountability 
(“ECNL Study, 2009”). 
A. The Independent Scrutiny Report 
A robust anti fraud (including anti tax fraud) regime would be of more 
general value to the [non-profit] sector and produce better data than a 
[Terrorist financing] oriented regime toned down for political rea-
sons.58 
In 2007, the European Commission published an Independent Scrutiny 
Report evaluating the EU’s efforts in the fight against terrorist financing 
under the FATF’s Special Recommendations and the EU Counter Terror-
ist Financing Strategy. According to the report, the fact that the FATF 
Recommendations and Special Recommendations did not constitute trea-
ty obligations but were rather “informal political commitments” left their 
implementation more vulnerable to national and regional politics with 
the effect that five years later, the nine special recommendations were 
still regarded as “Work in Progress.”59 In particular, the Report identified 
a number of structural difficulties that complicated the EU’s task of giv-
ing effect to the FATF’s ordinances at European level, many of which 
are particularly pertinent to European non-profit regulation efforts and 
                                                                                                                                     
 57. See Eur. Comm., Draft Minutes, European Forum for the Prevention of Organ-
ised Crime: Minutes of the Round Table Meeting of 30th March 2006 on “Preparatory 
Meeting to the Conference Transparent NPO Governance,” at 1, Brussels JLS/D2/DB D 
(2006) [hereinafter Draft Minutes, European Forum for the Prevention of Organised 
Crime]. 
 58. Independent Scrutiny Report, supra note 20, at 34. 
 59. Id. at 4. 
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the associated difficulties experienced at EU level with regard to the im-
plementation of SR VIII. 
1. No Fully Informed Baseline Assessment of Threats and Risks to the 
EU 
Notwithstanding the myriad of action plans, action points, and activi-
ties introduced by EU committees relating to combating the financing of 
terrorism (“CFT”), the EU lacks the capacity to undertake an ongoing 
internal review mechanism for its anti-money laundering and CFT 
measures. The report highlighted the absence of “a key instrument”—a 
fully informed baseline assessment of threats to the EU.60 According to 
the report, “without this, there is no way to direct the efforts and set pri-
orities, nor attribute success nor learn from failure. There are overlaps, 
gaps and difficulties in coordination.”61 
There is thus, in the words of Keohane, a paradox in the EU’s role in 
counter-terrorism: 
On the one hand, governments agree in principle that co-operation at 
the EU level is a good thing because of the cross-border nature of the 
terrorist threat. On the other hand, they are slow to give the Union the 
powers . . . and resources . . . it would need to be truly effective.62 
This difficulty is particularly acute in the context of SR VIII, given the 
absence of any EU wide assessment of the risk posed by the tens of mil-
lions of non-profits operating in the EU. The report acknowledged at-
tempts to fill this knowledge void in the context of non-profit organiza-
tions but conceded that these efforts were not proving successful.63 
2. Cultural Differences in Old and New Member States’ Approach 
Prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the EU did not exercise 
primary responsibility for CFT measures. Under the Maastricht Treaty’s 
three-pillar structure, the EU had direct effective powers under the first 
pillar relating to communautarised areas whereas matters arising under 
                                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Daniel Keohane, The Absent Friend: EU Foreign Policy and Counter-Terrorism, 
46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 125, 129 (2008). 
 63. Independent Scrutiny Report, supra note 20, at 33 (noting that “currently there is 
no EU wide assessment of the risk [non-profits] pose in the terrorist financing con-
text . . . . The ongoing absence of substantial and accepted corpus of empirical evidence 
of misuse impedes the dialogue with the third sector that the EC and some MS seek in 
order to develop effective policy.”). 
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either the second pillar (dealing with common foreign and security) or 
the third pillar (dealing with justice and home affairs) relied on efforts to 
coordinate, harmonise, and influence policies at an intergovernmental 
level.64 Decisions taken under the third pillar relating to CFT took the 
form of framework decisions,65 which gave considerable leeway to na-
tional parliaments in the transposition of law, which in turn led to signif-
icant legal variation across national legislation. 
The Scrutiny Report observed that “member states and their agencies 
are cautious in the extent to which they will allow the EU to take steps 
that impinge on national security issues arrangements unless it is part of 
a wider political process.”66 The cultural differences in approach between 
older EU Member States (comprising FATF members) and newer EU 
Member States (which learned to tackle anti-money laundering under the 
Council of Europe’s Moneyval process) further exacerbated this legisla-
tive reticence. The former group approached FATF measures from the 
perspective of maintaining the integrity of the financial system—a First 
Pillar matter—whereas the latter’s exposure under the Moneyval process 
had its roots in judicial cooperation, more associated with Third Pillar 
matters. According to the Scrutiny Report, there were thus “divergent 
approaches to AML/CFT on policy and in operational matters, which can 
feed back as particularism at the political level.”67 The effect of this re-
gional division has had implications for the EU’s implementation of SR 
VIII because of the division of opinion amongst Member States on the 
nature of regulation required.68 
3. Management of Key Individual Specialists 
With regard to the general implementation of the FATF SRs, even in 
areas in which the EU has competence to act for Member States, the 
Scrutiny Report found that the qualitative nature of Member State con-
sultation varied dramatically depending upon whether policies were 
based on the input of experienced front line professionals in law en-
forcement and financial intelligence, well versed in the highly complex 
environment of CFT, or upon the contribution of hard pressed govern-
ment officials nominally responsible for the area. This problem is magni-
fied in the context of European non-profit regulation, an area in which 
                                                                                                                                     
 64. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. 
 65. See, e.g., Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 38. 
 66. Independent Scrutiny Report, supra note 20, at 19. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 22 (noting that “implementation of SR VIII is still under discussion within 
the EU and awaits consensus regarding the policy towards NPOs, where a number of MS 
have strong reservations”). 
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the Scrutiny Report noted there was no effective control environment due 
to an absence at the EU level of a centralised system of registration, ac-
creditation, monitoring, and fiscal controls. Creation of such a centralised 
system would require a level of cooperation between national agencies 
that currently does not exist and even if it did, success would not be 
guaranteed since “nearly all member states are missing elements of such 
a system, and time and expense will be needed to put them in place, 
which again raises resources issue with respect to both individual NPOs 
and national level cooperation mechanisms.”69 Perhaps more damning, 
the Scrutiny Report raised a spectre that not all Member States were con-
vinced that an effective control system requires elements of registration 
and closer monitoring.70 
Turning to the Scrutiny Report’s findings on the specific implementa-
tion of SR VIII, the report found generally that terrorist financing of non-
profit organisations was not a prime concern in many European Member 
States.71 The report went so far as to query whether any additional gains 
would be made through the introduction of a specialist terrorist-financing 
regime for charities that could not be achieved through a tweaking of 
existing regimes.72 In the words of the report, “of the three main objec-
tives of SR VIII, posing as legitimate entity is seen as a form of conspir-
acy, whilst the use of NPOs as conduits, and for the purposes of diver-
sion, are seen as forms of money laundering and fraud,” leading authors 
and respondents alike to conclude that it might simply be wiser to 
strengthen existing anti-fraud measures instead.73 Conscious also that an 
effective anti-terrorist influenced regulatory regime for non-profits might 
undermine the work of non-profit organisations engaged in reducing the 
influence of militant groups in sensitive areas simply because they were 
working in these areas, the report concluded that superior information on 
those militant groups could better be obtained through existing powers or 
other covert means.74 
That the Commission intended to heed the advice of the Independent 
Scrutiny Report and to adopt a broader basis for reviewing the good gov-
ernance of EU-based non-profits seemed a strong possibility in late 2007. 
Abandoning its plan to create a twenty-four-member contact group 
                                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 33. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 34. 
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drawn from the public and private non-profit sector75 to implement the 
Non-profit Framework Code, the Commission instead funded two studies 
on the non-profit sector that were designed to begin to resolve the Euro-
pean information deficit in relation to the sector, identified by the Scruti-
ny Report. 
B. The Matrix Report (2008) 
In the absence of reliable information on the real level of threat, vulner-
ability and compliance, and without adequate understanding of the po-
tential benefits of new legislation the EC should be cautious about in-
troducing new forms of regulation and legislation.76 
The European Commission appointed Matrix to research and report on 
the most serious and frequent types of financial criminal activity affect-
ing non-profit organizations in the EU. Matrix was asked to estimate the 
volume and value of these offences at EU level and to identify appropri-
ate policy responses that might reduce non-profit vulnerability to finan-
cial criminal abuse.77 A worthy study from a European governance per-
spective—the results would assist the EU in ensuring that European 
grants at least were expended in a transparent and accountable fashion. 
The first difficulty encountered by Matrix was the lack of reliable statis-
tical databases on non-profit abuse in any Member State or across the EU 
as a whole. Many of the questions posited in the Delphi study elicited a 
high level of non-responsiveness notwithstanding the general nature of 
the questions asked.78 Moreover, the literature review revealed a great 
                                                                                                                                     
 75. The creation of the contact group was first announced by the Commission in its 
Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 20. It was intended that both 
the Commission’s Communication and the FATF Interpretative Note on SR VIII would 
serve as a basis to define the exact mandate of the group. See Draft Minutes, European 
Forum for the Prevention of Organised Crime, supra note 57, at 3. 
 76. MATRIX INSIGHT, STUDY TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT 
ORGANISATIONS FOR FINANCIAL CRIMINAL PURPOSES AT EU LEVEL, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, DG JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY 8 (Apr. 3, 2008) [hereinafter MATRIX 
REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/home-
af-
fairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/study_abuse_non_profit_orgs_for_financial_criminal_pur
poses_avril09.pdf (report commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-
General Justice, Freedom and Security). 
 77. Id. at 13. 
 78. Questions in the Delphi Study ranged from, “Could you estimate the number of 
instances of financial abuse of NPOs in your country of residence in the last 12 months? 
(this should not be restricted to legal cases)” to “In your opinion, do you think the num-
ber of instances of financial abuse of NPOs has increased or decreased in the last five 
years?” Id. at 70–75. 
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reliance of existing data on journalistic and unsupported case descrip-
tions.79 Given these lacunae, Matrix was forced to substantially modify 
its data collection plans (eliminating entirely a second-round Delphi 
study) and to settle for collation of a “general picture of the NPO abuse 
field” instead of the desired “accurate quantified estimates of volume, 
impact, incidence or prevalence” of non-profit financial abuse.80 
Two interesting and related findings emerge from the Matrix Report. 
The first relates to incidence and prevalence of non-profit financial abuse 
within the EU. According to the Report: 
If the available information is to be believed, the incidence and preva-
lence of NPO financial abuse in the EU are limited. Nevertheless, some 
level of criminal and terrorist misuse exists. The extent to which this is 
judged to be “a serious threat” depends on the tolerance levels of the 
observers . . . . [W]ithout better databases, reporting mechanisms and 
monitoring systems there is no way of knowing whether the expert 
group estimates are realistic or merely badly informed.81 
This finding led the authors to call for any imposed regulatory response 
to be a proportionate one, noting that stricter regulatory legislation 
“could create costs that might damage efficiency and effectiveness of the 
sector.”82 These findings are entirely consistent with the findings of the 
Independent Scrutiny Report. Referring specifically to the current levels 
of compliance with the FATF recommendations, the EU Communication 
(2005) 620 recommendations, and the proposed codes of conduct there-
under, the report urged that notwithstanding the importance of govern-
mental and EU regulation in this context, the need for any further regula-
tion had to be approached with caution “especially considering the UK 
and US records.”83 
Secondly, the Matrix Report recognised the potential for governments 
in politically challenged environments to use regulation to undermine the 
work of non-profit organisations.84 Drawing on UK research,85 the report 
                                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 6. 
 80. Id. at 7. 
 81. Id. at 66. Statistically, there was very little evidence of non-profit abuse as regards 
terrorist financing. According to Matrix, “In terms of court trials, in 2005–06 a total of 
303 persons across Europe were tried on terrorism charges (the majority, 205, in Spain) 
and a further 136 court proceedings were reported as ongoing. No information was avail-
able either formally or informally about the involvement of NPOs in these cases.” Id. at 
28. 
 82. Id. at 66–67. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
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referred to the negative effect that counterterrorism legislation in particu-
lar had already had on non-profit organisations, noting the implications 
of unintentional violation of counter-terrorism measures for non-profits 
and suggesting that the burden of mitigating this risk had led to scaling 
back of humanitarian work in some areas.86 
The message sent out very clearly from the Matrix Study was thus that 
a first step along the path to greater regulation of non-profits must in-
volve a more accurate understanding of the true level of threat to these 
organizations. The need for such empirical data was essential to enable a 
proportionate and appropriate response. In addition, Matrix saw the way 
forward for European regulation of non-profits as involving the conduct-
ing of a periodic victimisation survey with an adequate budget to gener-
ate an effective database to assess threat and vulnerability trends, exam-
ine the efficacy of preventive measures, and monitor regulation and leg-
islation; the creation of a virtual NPO ‘college’ to encourage greater in-
formation exchange; a proactive media strategy; maintenance and im-
provement of non-profit registers; training and tools for non-profit self-
regulation; simple due diligence models; NPO to NPO mentoring; and 
identification of a lead agency in every Member State.87 
C. ECNL Report (2009) 
The disconnect between the areas covered by ongoing public and self 
regulation initiatives and the FATF and EC recommendations signal the 
difficulties [Member States] face when attempting to implement rec-
ommendations in their national contexts . . . .88 
                                                                                                                                     
 85. Most particularly the work of International NGO Training and Research Center 
(“INTRAC”) and National Council for Voluntary Organisations (“NCVO”). See INT’L 
NGO TRAINING & RESEARCH CTR., www.intrac.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2011); see also 
NOLAN QUIGLEY & BELINDA PRATTEN, NCVO, SECURITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE 




 86. MATRIX REPORT, supra note 76, at 33–34. 
 87. Id. at 8–9. 
 88. Eur. Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law [ECNL], Study on the Recent Public and Self-
Regulatory Initiatives Improving Transparency and Accountability of Non-Profit Organi-
sations in the European Union, at 94 (2009) (by Nilda Bullain & Katerina Hadzi-Miceva) 
(commissioned by the European Commission Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and 
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The Commission published the second of the two commissioned re-
ports in April 2009.89 The ECNL Study on Recent Public and Self-
Regulatory Initiatives Improving Transparency and Accountability of 
Non-Profit Organisations in the European Union sought to consider the 
measures adopted in the twenty-seven EU Member States to improve 
non-profit transparency and accountability in the overall context of inter-
national and European initiatives to address the risk of non-profits being 
used as conduits for terrorist financing.90 To this end, the study focused 
on the response of Member States to the implementation of the FATF SR 
VIII in light of Commission Communication (2005) 620, the interpreta-
tive note to FATF SR VIII, and the FATF Best Practices Paper on SR 
VIII. 
The ECNL Study begins to tackle the information deficit that exists at 
a European level in relation to statutory and non-statutory regulatory 
measures currently underway in the twenty-seven Member States of the 
EU. Following interviews with over 130 government officials and poli-
cymakers, non-profit lawyers and practitioners, and research centres 
across the Union, ECNL identified more than 140 self-regulation and 
public regulation initiatives relating to non-profit accountability and 
transparency undertaken in the past five years.91 As part of the study, 
ECNL sought to carry out an in-depth analysis of selected initiatives in 
terms of the motivating factor behind their introduction and an assess-
ment of their impact to date. The breadth of the research undertaken also 
allowed ECNL to begin to identify common trends in these initiatives, 
with a view towards identifying and creating best practice. 
The ECNL Study begins to identify the challenges that face the EU 
when it seeks to act at the EU level in relation to non-profit organiza-
tions. Like the Independent Scrutiny Report, the study found regional 
differences a factor influencing implementation—in this case, the differ-
ing common law and civil law conceptions of the ‘non-profit sector.’92 
The treatment of non-profits under common law is governed by the legal 
concept of charity.93 Thus, in the UK’s three legal jurisdictions94 and in 
                                                                                                                                     
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 8–9. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. Id. at 11–18. 
 93. Id. at 12. 
 94. The United Kingdom comprises, apart from England and Wales, the devolved 
governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland. The parliamentary assemblies of the latter 
two regions possess competence to legislate independently in the realm of charity regula-
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Ireland, regulators focus on the activity of an organisation and whether it 
provides a public benefit.95 Qualifying organisations, or ‘charities,’ are 
subject to a more stringent regime of regulation than other non-profits.96 
Yet, it is estimated that charities account for only half the 865,000 non-
profits in the UK.97 In contrast, civil law treatment of non-profits is based 
upon legal form and not activity.98 In many civil law jurisdictions, the 
purpose of registration as either an association or foundation is to obtain 
legal personality and basic tax exemptions although it is becoming more 
common for extra tax exemptions to be awarded to a subset of these reg-
istered non-profits that serve publicly beneficial purposes.99 
In European terms, this divergence in terminology can lead policymak-
ers to talk at cross-purposes since ‘the sector’ in common law countries 
commonly refers to the smaller ‘charity sector’ (which tend to enjoy sim-
ilar treatment when it comes to registration, reporting, and tax issues) 
whereas ‘the sector’ in civil law countries tends to refer to the broader 
‘non-profit sector,’ which includes but is in no way limited to public 
benefit organisations that are subject to a range of registration, reporting, 
and tax requirements. Culturally, registration—a term used frequently in 
the Commission Communication (2005) 620 and FATF documents—has 
different connotations depending on one’s common law or civil law per-
spective. In the former, registration refers to “an act of state acknowl-
edgement of eligibility for public support”100 whereas in the latter regis-
tration refers to “the act of acquiring legal personality, quite independent 
of any eligibility for tax benefits.”101 
Understanding this legal and cultural divide between European Mem-
ber States is crucial to the development of any proposed EU level com-
mon action in so far as it indicates that the ‘non-profit sector’ is not a 
homogenous entity. For its part, the FATF takes a narrow interest in non-
profit organisations, defining them in its Interpretative Note on SR VIII 
as comprised of “legal [entities] or organization[s] that primarily engage 
in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, 
cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out 
                                                                                                                                     
tion with the exception of matters relating to tax, which are decided on a uniform basis 
for the entire United Kingdom by the parliament at Westminster. 
 95. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 12. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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of other types of ‘good works.’”102 Closer to home, the European Com-
mission has drawn on this FATF guidance, proposing that its suggested 
more stringent non-profit registration and accountability requirements 
should apply to those non-profits “that are wishing to take advantage of 
special tax treatment, access to public grants, [and] the right to public 
fundraising.”103 Yet, as the ECNL Study points out,104 this categorization 
works efficiently only in common law jurisdictions. Many civil law 
countries lack the charity/public benefit concept and in its absence dif-
ferent laws provide tax benefits and state support to a variety of non-
profit forms using various accountability standards. Even in those civil 
law countries that have a concept equivalent to public benefit, there is no 
uniform application of tax benefits or accountability requirements, mak-
ing it at best difficult to conceive of a European-wide measure that could 
reach the non-profit sector and regulate it accordingly.105 
The nub of the challenge, identified by the Study, relates to the diffi-
culties of the imposition of top-down regulation. In the words of the 
Study authors, “the need to overcome the basic differences between the 
two major legal systems in addition to the varying cultural and historical 
factors may make any attempt at a pan-European regulatory or self regu-
latory initiative extremely challenging.”106 Given the obstacles to a top 
down harmonization of non-profit regulation, the study instead comes at 
the problem from a bottom up perspective. The Study identifies more 
than 140 non-profit regulatory initiatives introduced in the twenty-seven 
Member States of the EU, aimed at enhancing non-profit transparency 
and accountability over the past five years.107 
The report outlines nineteen of these initiatives (comprising both pub-
lic and self-regulatory measures) in detail.108 The selected initiatives are 
viewed by the authors as examples of best practices in areas ranging 
from registration and reporting,109 accounting,110 fundraising,111 certifica-
                                                                                                                                     
 102. Interpretative Note to SR VIII, supra note 14, ¶ 4. 
 103. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 20. 
 104. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 13. 
 105. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 13 (This led the ECNL to comment that “the im-
plementation of the requirements of EC COM and FATF SR VIII, which seem to treat the 
‘NPO sector’ as a homogenous entity, would be more easily enforceable in the common 
law systems (through the charity concept) than in the civil law systems.”). 
 106. Id. at 15. 
 107. Id. at 130. 
 108. Id. ch. IV. 
 109. Case studies of Ireland’s proposed registration and reporting system under the 
new Charities Act 2009; of Malta’s integrated system of registration, reporting and regu-
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tion and accreditation,112 codes of conduct,113 to public benefit status,114 
and counter-terrorism.115 In addition, an attempt is made to gauge the 
potential transferability of these programmes to other jurisdictions.116 
Amongst the chosen jurisdictions is a good mixture of old EU Member 
States (e.g., Ireland, the UK, and the Netherlands) and newer Members 
(Poland, Malta, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Hungary), allowing also for a 
consideration of regulatory practices in both civil and common law sys-
tems with non-profit regimes at different degrees of maturity and estab-
lishment. 
To a degree, there is some alignment between the aims of the FATF 
guidelines, the objectives of Commission’s Communication (2005) 620, 
and the policy goals of a number of the national initiatives considered by 
ECNL. There is thus a strong focus on registration and public database 
requirements, as well as requirements relating to accounts, reporting, and 
monitoring of non-profits. A divergence, however, does exist between 
the EU/FATF emphasis on ‘know your donor/beneficiary’ principles, 
which according to ECNL, are scarcely addressed in recent national ini-
tiatives, as well as those issues which Member States are concerned with 
but which feature to a much lesser extent in EU/FATF documents—
namely, public benefit status; NPO accounting and bookkeeping; internal 
governance; fundraising; and transparency of public funding.117 
                                                                                                                                     
lation; of the central registry systems in the UK, Austria, and Bulgaria; and of the pro-
posed European registers under Guidestar. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 31. 
 110. Case study of the UK’s Statement of Recommended Practice for Charity Ac-
counting (the “SORP”)—described by ECNL as “[a] comprehensive framework and set 
of standards for charity accounting and interpretation on how to meet those standards.” 
ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 30. 
 111. Case study of Ireland’s mixed regulatory model for fundraising and of Finland’s 
Money Collection Act. Id. at 67. 
 112. Id. at 33 (drawing on examples from Austria (Austrian Seal of Quality for Dona-
tions to Charities), Hungary (Trademark of Trust scheme), The Netherlands (International 
Committee on Fundraising Organisations (“ICFO”) and Central Bureau on Fundraising)). 
 113. Id. at 72–77 (presenting case studies of both the Estonian Code of Ethics of Non-
profit Organizations (“The most successful effort to develop a sector-wide code in CEE”) 
and Irish Code of Corporate Governance for Irish Development Non-profit Organisa-
tions). 
 114. Id. at 28, 49–51, 60–63 (presenting case studies of The Netherlands and Bulgaria 
as interesting model approaches to public benefit status). 
 115. Id. at 40–45 (presenting a case study of the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales’ Counter Terrorism Strategy—the only explicit counter-terrorist strategy for the 
NPO sector published by a European regulator). 
 116. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 31. 
 117. Id. at 94. 
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D. Implications of Matrix and ECNL Studies for Pan-European Non-
profit Regulation 
Whereas the Matrix Report comes from a financial abuse perspective 
and the ECNL Study comes from a mapping of existing accountability 
structures perspective, the message they deliver to the Commission is 
similar: favouring bottom-up accountability based on a better empirical 
understanding of the European non-profit sector. Both reports focus on 
the need for some determination of the common interests of stakeholders 
if policy implementation is to be advanced. Identifying one such interest 
as the strengthening of the non-profit sector, ECNL outlines the ad-
vantages that a successful achievement of this interest would hold for 
Member States (by increasing capacity to comply with public regula-
tion), the EU (by making the sector a reliable and significant partner in 
the fight against terrorism and money laundering), and for non-profits 
themselves (by improving relationships with regulators through an in-
creased capacity to understand the need for regulation). 
Matrix, for its part, envisages a strengthening of the sector through in-
stitutional changes, including the creation of European mechanism (e.g., 
a virtual NPO college) to allow non-profit representatives and public of-
ficials at national and EU level to share information and good practices, 
thereby building up expertise in particular areas. Matrix acknowledges 
the uneven development and maturity of the European non-profit sector, 
however, when it advocates the creation of non-profit to non-profit men-
toring schemes across the EU.118 Both reports admit that much work re-
mains to be done before the principle of ‘know your donor, know your 
beneficiary’ can be achieved effectively at EU level. Whereas Matrix 
calls for better due diligence by non-profits in this regard,119 ECNL is 
more circumspect citing the need for further discussions and progress in 
other areas as a precursor to achieving this principle.120 
The sector’s generally positive response to both reports shows broad 
support for the common findings that there is little evidence of non-profit 
abuse for terrorist financing purposes and that to continue to base regula-
                                                                                                                                     
 118. MATRIX REPORT, supra note 76, at 68. 
 119. Id. at 9 (advocating that “[t]he simplest procedures such as checking the refer-
ences and CVs of prospective staff are often the most effective. These measures should 
add value to the general management of NPOs as well as contribute to threat reduction.”). 
 120. ECNL Study, supra note 88, at 30 (“Given that the implementation of these prin-
cipal recommendations is highly sensitive and that many interests are involved, it would 
seem that in order to have a fruitful stakeholder discussion on these issues, [achievement 
of] the previously described [ECNL recommendations] would be useful . . . .”). 
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tory efforts purely on this ground is unjustified.121 Rather, non-profits 
urge that any future role of the EU should be driven by proportionality 
and subsidiarity, thereby complementing existing or encouraging new 
regulation at a national level.122 At a meeting in April 2008 to discuss the 
recommendations of and follow-up to the Matrix Report, the Commis-
sion, in response to non-profit submissions, stated that “any follow up 
action would be proportionate and focused on the threats” and that “en-
hanced NPO transparency has to be considered in a larger perspective, 
that good governance and transparency help provid[e] assurance that 
NPOs operate with integrity and effectiveness in meeting their mission 
purposes.”123 The Commission, therefore, stressed the importance of a 
“focus on prevention rather than repression.”124 The extent to which the 
Commission and, indeed, other EU actors adhere to these principles is 
questionable in light of recent developments, to which we now turn. 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2009–2010 
The strong support for a subsidiarity approach to non-profit regulation 
espoused by Matrix and ECNL has not found universal acceptance in the 
EU. In the words of the European Counter Terrorism Coordinator, “Since 
non-profit organisations frequently have an international profile, it is 
necessary to find international solutions, notably at EU level, as a com-
                                                                                                                                     
 121. See Cordaid, Contemporary Minutes of Commission Meeting on Non-Profit Sec-
tor Transparency, EC, DG JLS (Apr. 25, 2008); see also EU CIVIL SOC’Y CONTACT 
GROUP, CONTRIBUTION ON NPO TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter EU CIVIL SOC’Y CONTACT GROUP] (observing that “[c]ounter-terrorism con-
cerns should not overlook the other obligations of the NPO sector, and the EC should 
address transparency and accountability issues under a wider and mutually reinforcing 
approach. A pure counter-terrorism approach would create the feeling that initiatives are 
singling out the NPO sector without justification rather than contributing to strengthening 
it, and would jeopardize ownership by NPOs.”); MARK SIDEL, REGULATION OF THE 
VOLUNTARY SECTOR: FREEDOM AND SECURITY IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY 97–98 (2010). 
 122. EU CIVIL SOC’Y CONTACT GROUP, supra note 121, at 1; see also EUR. FOUND. 
CTR., COMMENTS ON THE STUDY “RECENT PUBLIC AND SELF-REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION” 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.efc.be/EUAdvocacy/EFC%20Statements/2009_EFCcomment_ECNLrpt.pdf 
(adopting a more hard-line approach that “based on the findings of the ECNL study, 
which have confirmed the preliminary results of the 2008 Matrix study, there is no scope 
for specific legislation regarding Transparency and Accountability . . . of national foun-
dations and other NPOs or soft law approach (Code of conduct) at EU level.”). 
 123. Sidel, supra note 121, at 97 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 124. Id. 
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plement to domestic measures.”125 In his 2009 Strategy Implementation 
Report, referring to the Matrix and ECNL studies, the Coordinator 
claimed: 
Based on these studies and the input received [from non-profits invited 
to comment on the studies], the Commission will further examine the 
right way to respond to the threat of potential abuse of non-profit or-
ganisations for terrorist financing purposes. The aim should be that all 
Member States are assessed as ‘compliant’ with regard to Special Rec-
ommendation VIII of the FATF.126 
These comments have prompted some NGOs to argue that the reports are 
being used by the EU to justify the implementation of FATF SR VIII 
“despite failing to provide supporting evidence that NGOs have been 
abused/exploited by terrorists.”127 
Notwithstanding its more accommodating stance in its response to the 
publication of the Matrix Report, the Commission too seems to have re-
considered its broader governance basis and once more has returned to 
counter-terrorism concerns as the basis for European non-profit regula-
tion. In its 2009 Communication on the draft Stockholm Programme it 
proposed: 
The instruments for combating the financing of terrorism must be 
adapted to the new potential vulnerabilities of the financial system and 
to the new payment methods used by terrorists. We must have a mech-
anism that allows both adequate monitoring of financial flows and ef-
fective and transparent identification of people and groups likely to fi-
nance terrorism. Recommendations must be prepared for charitable or-
ganisations to increase their transparency and responsibility.128 
The Stockholm Programme, negotiated by the European Council, de-
fines a five-year framework for the EU in the area of justice and home 
                                                                                                                                     
 125. Council of the European Union, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Revised Strategy 
on Terrorist Financing, at 8, 11778/1/08 REV 1 (July 17, 2008). 
 126. Council of the European Union, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Report on the 
Implementation of the Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, at 7, 8864/1/09 REV 1 
(May 5, 2009). 
 127. Ben Hayes, Statewatch, Briefing on EU Proposals to Increase the Financial 
Transparency of Charities and Non-Profit Organisations, STATEWATCH.ORG (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-92-briefing-eu-financial-transparency-
charities.pdf. 
 128. Communication from the Commission to the European parliament and the Coun-
cil: An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen, at 23, COM (2009) 
262 final (June 10, 2009). 
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affairs.129 The Swedish Presidency’s draft programme, published in Oc-
tober 2009, ominously directed the Commission “to propose legal stand-
ards for charitable organisations to increase their transparency and re-
sponsibility so as to ensure compatibility with Special Recommendation 
(SR) VIII of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).”130 This threat of 
legally binding measures, however, disappeared in the final version of 
the Stockholm Programme, which requested the Commission instead to 
“promote increased transparency and responsibility for charitable organi-
sations with a view to ensuring compatibility with Special Recommenda-
tion (SR) VIII of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).”131 
The Commission’s response to date has been two-fold: in June 2010, it 
indicated its intention to publish a Communication on voluntary anti-
terrorist financing guidelines for EU based non-profit organizations in 
2011;132 and in July 2010, it published a short Discussion Paper on the 
proposed non-profit organization guidelines. 
A. Commission Discussion Paper on NPO Guidelines under Consulta-
tion (Sept 2010) 
On July 2, 2010, the Commission held its third transparency and ac-
countability conference in the non-profit sector for a select group of in-
vited non-profit organisations and representatives from Member State 
governments.133 The Directorate General for Home Affairs (“DG 
Home”) used the conference to launch its discussion paper on Voluntary 
Guidelines for EU based non-profit organizations. The four-page paper 
opens with the claim that there is concrete proof of the vulnerability of 
non-profit organizations for terrorist financing purposes.134 The cited au-
                                                                                                                                     
 129. Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme—An Open and Se-
cure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter Stockholm 
Program]. 
 130. Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme—An Open and Se-
cure Europe Serving the Citizen (Draft), at 23, 14449/09 (Oct. 16, 2009). 
 131. Stockholm Programme, supra note 129, ¶ 4.5. 
 132. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Deliv-
ering an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for Europe’s Citizens: Action Plan Im-
plementing the Stockholm Programme, at 40, COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme]. 
 133. Eur. Comm., DG Home, Discussion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines for EU Based 
Non-profit Organisations ¶ 2.1.3 (July 2, 2010) [hereinafter DG Home Voluntary Guide-
lines], available at 
http://www.efc.be/EUAdvocacy/Documents/2010_DGHOMe_NPOGuidelines_Discussio
n%20Paper.pdf. 
 134. Id. at 1. 
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thorities in support of this statement, however, date back to 2003135 and 
no reference is made to the Commission’s more recent commissioned 
studies that demonstrate that the risk of such abuse is remote in most in-
stances of well-governed organizations. Proceeding from this basis of 
threat, the Discussion Paper identifies six specific areas in which the 
Commission intends to develop guidance, namely: a) basic principles for 
good non-profit organization practice; b) good governance; c) accounta-
bility and transparency; d) relations to the donor; e) relations to the bene-
ficiary; and f) suspicious activity reporting.136 
The principles set out under these headings although addressed broadly 
to ‘non-profit organizations’ are aimed, as is common in previous EU 
documents, at entities that use their assets “exclusively for charitable or 
other legitimate purposes” and whose activities are “directed towards the 
attainment of the organisation’s stated public benefit goals.”137 Once 
more, this approach applies a common law definition of “non-profit” to 
common and civil law jurisdictions alike, with all the attending problems 
identified by the ECNL Study that this creates.138 Five of the draft guide-
lines are taken verbatim from the original Framework Code,139 and for 
the most part, problems identified earlier with these requirements in the 
Commission’s original 2005 consultation have not been taken into con-
sideration. 
One such example lies under the heading of accountability and trans-
parency and relates to the requirement on non-profits to keep audit trails 
of all funds transferred outside the EU, including a requirement to carry 
out on-site audits of beneficiaries to ensure that funds are safe from ter-
rorists.140 The audit guideline makes no reference to already existing na-
tional reporting requirements for non-profits and thus may be assumed to 
be an additional requirement. More worryingly, the guideline makes no 
allowance for the compliance capacity of smaller organizations. The only 
concession to smaller organizations occurs in the recognition that 
                                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 2. 
 138. See supra note 88. 
 139. See DG Home Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 133. Guidelines 2.3(1), 2.3(3), 
and 2.3(5) pertain to transparency and accountability, and Guideline 2.5(1) pertains to 
relations to the beneficiary. Most of Guideline 2.3(10), dealing with the use of formal 
channels for money flows, also originates from the Framework Code of Conduct, alt-
hough a qualifier to this guideline has been added to the effect that account may be taken 
of the varying capacities of financial sectors in different countries and in different areas 
of urgent charitable and humanitarian concerns. 
 140. See id. ¶ 2.3(3). 
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“[s]implified accounting and reporting requirements should apply to 
NPOs under a certain size,”141 but no similar concession is made in rela-
tion to audit requirements. 
The Guidelines also lack clarity in their current form. Under the head-
ing ‘Basic Principles for good non-profit organization practice’ the 
guidelines provide that a non-profit “will answer honestly all reasonable 
questions about its fundraising costs and it will do so within a reasonable 
timeframe.”142 There is no indication as to whether this refers to requests 
in general or requests simply from national regulators. Another of the 
Basic Principles’ provisions requires that “NPOs should consider, on a 
risk-based approach . . . making reference to publicly available infor-
mation, to determine whether any of their own employees are suspected 
of being involved in activities relating to terrorism, including terrorist 
financing.”143 The discussion document, however, is silent as to which 
government list of proscribed organizations should be used to vet em-
ployees or the consequences for the organization of any such finding. 
Ambiguity persists also in relation to Suspicious Activity Reporting, 
with the guidelines providing that “NPOs should make a report to the 
Police or the Financial Intelligence Unit when there is any knowledge or 
suspicion of terrorist property/activity.”144 Aside from the mandatory 
tone of this language, which does not sit with the voluntary nature of the 
guidelines, it is unclear to which Financial Intelligence Unit or police 
authority such reports should be made or at what level. Further problems 
can be identified in the guidelines on governance, one of which provides 
that “it is important for NPOs to have independent oversight of its chari-
table operations, whereby the oversight structure best could be defined 
following the individual organisation of the NPO.”145 Yet, it is unclear 
from this statement whether independent oversight means board review 
of management decisions or some other form of external audit. 
Risk indicator factors make a return in the Commission’s Discussion 
Paper, with non-profits being “asked to identify the specific risk which 
they have to face of being abused for terrorist financing purposes.”146 
The Discussion Paper suggests some broad-ranging criteria for determin-
ing the existence of such risk, which include non-profit: 
                                                                                                                                     
 141. Id. ¶ 2.3(1). 
 142. Id. ¶ 2.1(1). 
 143. Id. ¶ 2.1(6). 
 144. Id. ¶ 2.6(1). 
 145. Id. ¶ 2.2(1). 
 146. Id. 
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• involvement in programmes or projects in territories outside 
the EU, in particular in high risk areas (where terrorist activity 
is known to occur); 
• co-operation with NPOs that conduct or contribute to pro-
grammes or projects in these areas; 
• usage of alternative remittance systems or other payment 
methods, which are beyond the traditional financial mecha-
nisms; 
• difficulties in overseeing own projects, for example because of 
third parties being involved in them.147 
For EU-based non-profits working in high-risk areas where govern-
mental control has broken down and/or terrorist organisations are known 
to be active, these requirements raise serious concerns. From a legal per-
spective, the guidelines are silent as to whom non-profits are to report the 
outcome of their risk evaluation; neither is there any discussion as to le-
gal or liability consequences that meeting these risk indicators will have 
for non-profits. It is difficult to see how a requirement of this nature fits 
under a heading entitled ‘basic principles’ since no principle is stated—
rather action is required on the part of the non-profit. The implication of 
this section is that meeting these risk indicators will result in a finding of 
non-profit abuse for terrorist financing purposes. In this regard, the think-
ing of DG Home Affairs appears to be at odds with the policy of DG De-
velopment, as expressed in the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (“EIDHR”)148 and in the Commission’s 2007 Communi-
cation on Fragile Situations.149 In the Commission’s EIDHR Strategy 
Paper for 2011–2013, the Commission recognises its role under the 
EIDHR as being one allowing for the delivery of assistance in principle 
without the need for host government consent, thus enabling it “to focus 
on sensitive political issues and innovative approaches and to cooperate 
                                                                                                                                     
 147. Id. ¶ 2.1(5). 
 148. See Council Regulation 1889/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 386) (EC). The European In-
strument for Democracy and Human Rights (“EIDHR”) is aimed at those difficult situa-
tions in which donors shift from direct engagement with governments to support other 
actors that can drive change. Procedures established under the EIDHR are well adapted to 
situations of fragility, which support alternative actors in situations that are not favoura-
ble to participatory development or to respect for human rights. 
 149. Communication Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility, COM (2007) 
643 final (Oct. 25, 2007). The Communication acknowledges the important role played 
by civil society organizations in fragile situations, noting that these entities “have great 
potential for driving change, which can be maximised by facilitating their access to fund-
ing.” Id. 
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directly with local civil society organisations that need to preserve inde-
pendence from public authorities, as well as to be active in countries that 
may be described as ‘difficult partnerships.’”150 
The Discussion paper does not address how the non-binding guidelines 
outlined therein will be applied by the Commission (for instance, wheth-
er they will be a factor in the awarding of European funding) nor is there 
any indication of the Commission’s expectations regarding Member 
States or national regulatory authority implementation of them. Despite 
DG Home Affairs’ strong interest in adopting a final proposal only after 
close consultation with the non-profit sector and Member States,151 there 
is pressure on the Commission to deliver on its commitments in the 
Stockholm Action Plan and to publish a Communication with recom-
mendations on the prevention of non-profit abuse for terrorist financing 
in early 2011.152 A Communication would not be legally binding but 
would provide policy guidance for the Council of Ministers and the Eu-
ropean Parliament. 
B. Non-profit Sector Responses to Commission Discussion Paper 
To date, the Commission’s consultation with non-profit bodies has 
been narrowly focused on a select group who were invited to its July 
meeting on non-profit transparency and accountability.153 These bodies 
along with Member State representatives were asked to comment on the 
draft guidelines by mid-September, with the Commission proposing to 
consider submissions in October 2010.154 No general public consultation 
                                                                                                                                     
 150. Commission Strategy Paper 2011–2013: European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), at 13, COM (2010), 2432 (Sept. 23, 2010). 
 151. See DG Home Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 133. 
 152. See Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, supra note 132; see 
also Commission Communication, The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Main Achieve-
ments and Future Challenges, at 8, COM (2010) 386 final (July 19, 2010) (the Commis-
sion noting that, “Apart from legislation, the Commission also develops policy measures 
to counter terrorist financing, for example voluntary guidelines to address the vulnerabil-
ity of non-profit organisations with regard to abuse for terrorist financing purposes. A 
Communication is planned for early 2011.”). 
 153. About fifteen non-profit bodies were represented at the Commission’s meeting in 
July, along with representatives of some, but not all Member States. In some instances 
the non-profit invitees received very little advance notice, putting them at a disadvantage 
when it came to representing their members. See, e.g., EUCLID NETWORK, supra note 44 
(noting that Euclid, a European network of civil society leaders, was invited to participate 
in the meeting one week before it occurred, giving it “little or no time to consult with 
members”). 
 154. EUR. FOUND. CTR., THERE IS NO NEED FOR EU VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR NPOS 
(Sept. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.efc.be/News/Pages/thereisnoneedforEuvoluntaryguidelines.aspx. 
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has been undertaken to elicit the views of potentially affected non-profits 
on the draft guidelines. Indeed, neither the Discussion Paper nor the de-
liberations of the July meeting are publicly available on the DG Home 
Affairs website. It is thus unsurprising that the Commission has not pub-
lished non-profit submissions received to date though some non-profits 
have published their submissions independently.155 
Non-profit responses to the Commission share a series of concerns 
with respect to the draft guidelines. These concerns cover the misplaced 
motivations behind and rationale for the guidelines, their proposed scope, 
the lack of clarity and consistency in the language used, and the failure in 
drafting the guidelines to fully appreciate and respect the diversity of the 
entities that make up the non-profit sector. Most of the submissions make 
the point that terrorist abuse of European based non-profit organisations 
is both rare and unlikely in the European context.156 In a joint declaration 
on the proposed voluntary guidelines, the European Foundation Centre 
(“EFC”), Cordaid, and the Samenwerkende Brancheorganisaties Filant-
ropie (“SBF”) point to the Commission’s own research in the form of the 
Matrix and ECNL Studies in this area to rebut the case of presumed vul-
nerability on the part of non-profits.157 The EFC/Cordaid/SBF statement 
further calls on the Commission to disentangle specific counter-terrorist 
provisions from elaboration of general good practices in the discussion 
paper on the basis that “[c]riminal practices should be dealt with by crim-
                                                                                                                                     
 155. See, e.g., Eur. Found. Ctr., Cordaid, & Samenwerkende Brancheorganisaties 
Filantropie, Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper”Voluntary Guidelines for EU 
based Non-Profit Organisations,” (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://www.efc.be/EUAdvocacy/Documents/EFC_CordaidJoint-SBF-
comment_10September.pdf [hereinafter Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper]. The 
EUCLID Network and Humanitarian Forum have also published their submissions. 
ECNL provided the author with a copy of its response to the Commission, Eur. Ctr. for 
Not-for-Profit Law, Comments on Discussion Paper, “Voluntary Guidelines for EU 
based Non-Profit Organisations,”(Sept. 10, 2010). BOND informed the author that it 
submitted a letter supporting the submission of EFC/Cordaid/SBF that raised no new 
issues. Email from Katherine Astill, Sector Advocacy Officer, BOND, to Oonagh Breen, 
Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University College Dublin (Sept. 27, 2010, 11:46 
GMT) (on file with author). 
 156. See EUCLID NETWORK, supra note 44 (drawing on the comments of experts pre-
sent at the Commission’s July meeting); see also The Humanitarian Forum, Response to 
Consultation Paper from European Commission: Enhancing Transparency and Account-
ability of the Non-Profit Sector (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Response to Consultation 
Paper from European Commission] (arguing that the threat of the sector is overstated and 
the case for additional measures in respect of non-profits is unproved). 
 157. Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper, supra note 155. 
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inal law and not by tightening the requirements, oversight and operating 
frameworks of a single sector, namely that of NPOs.”158 
A common theme in the submissions is the disappointment expressed 
at the Commission’s failure to appreciate and articulate the immense val-
ue of the non-profit sector to the EU in terms both of service delivery and 
also as a facilitator of European integration. The EFC/CORDAID/SBF 
joint declaration finds it regrettable that the 
role of NPOs and their contribution to stable and healthy societies is 
not always clearly acknowledged, nor is their vital contribution in areas 
such as conflict resolution or addressing violent radicalism. NPOs play 
a crucial social and economic role in Europe and beyond and their con-
tribution to the public benefit is highly valuable to society and should 
not be called into question.159 
Two submissions take the Commission to task over its non-contextual 
use of the term ‘voluntary’ guidelines.160 In its submission, the ECNL 
cites the negative experience of American non-profits under the US 
Treasury Department’s Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary 
Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities.161 The common difficulty with 
‘voluntary’ guidelines, as is illustrated by the American experience, is 
that what may be voluntary in theory can evolve into de facto legal re-
quirements for those subject to them.162 Given that the Commission is 
silent as to the intended use of the guidelines, the fact that the voluntari-
ness element of the guidance might be overlooked in practice both by 
European institutions and other government bodies is a live issue. In the 
words of the ECNL, “[i]f the EC or MS were, for example, to incorporate 
                                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 2. 
 159. See id; see also Response to Consultation Paper from European Commission, 
supra note 156, at 1 (to the effect that the guidelines show little “visible understanding of 
the great work done by NGOs from Islamic countries or the West alike, nor of the chal-
lenges they face”). 
 160. See Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper, supra note 155 (arguing that there 
is no need for the proposed new voluntary guidelines); see also ECNL, Comments on 
Discussion Paper “Voluntary Guidelines for EU Based Non-Profit Organisations,” at 2 
(Sept. 14, 2010) [hereinafter ECNL Comments]. 
 161. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ANTI-TERRORIST 
FINANCING GUIDELINES: VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES [here-
inafter ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES]. 
 162. ECNL Comments, supra note 160, at 2 (citing the example of the federal agency 
running the Combined Federal Campaign invoking the Treasury Guidelines to insist that 
recipients of CFC funding certify that they did not “knowingly employ individuals or 
contribute funds to organizations found on the . . . terrorist related lists promulgated by 
the U.S. Government, the United Nations, or the European Union.” Although later re-
versed, this requirement cost non-profits a significant amount in lost funding.). 
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certification of compliance with the guidelines as a condition of funding, 
the guidelines would become, in effect, legal requirements.”163 
Moreover, in cases in which Member States imposed different manda-
tory requirements at national level to the European voluntary guideline 
criteria, this could cause great confusion for non-profit organizations 
faced with choosing between contradictory standards. A further fear is 
raised in this regard by the Humanitarian Forum, which suggests that the 
draft guidelines could be used by non-EU governments in a manner op-
pressive to non-profit organizations and their activities, particularly in 
regions in which “NPOs may be under suspicion for providing competi-
tion with, or advocacy against, oppressive and/or corrupt Govern-
ments.”164 
Nearly all the submissions seek to clarify the role of the Commission 
in relation to the non-profit sector and the context for its Discussion Pa-
per. For ECNL, the purpose of the guidelines is “to encourage NPOs to 
review their internal rules, to increase awareness about potential terror-
ism abuse and thus reduce the risk of NPOs’ possible abuse for terrorist 
financing purposes.”165 Achievement of this goal would require the 
guidelines to lose their prescriptive tone and instead serve as “descriptors 
of the common issues and practices, leaving room for further develop-
ment of a diverse range of practices, appropriate to particular kinds of 
NPOs, to lessen the risk of diversion of funds.”166 In its submission, 
ECNL argues that the EU is in a position to act as a convenor, bringing 
Member States and their best practices together to be shared precisely 
because of the lack of specific regulation at an EU wide level that could 
otherwise serve as a reference point for the guidelines.167 The Euclid 
Network (“Euclid”) also sees value in the recasting of the guidelines but 
in its model based on good governance principles, the Commission’s role 
is not one of convenor but of adjudicator, empowered both to stimulate 
good governance and to reward those organizations actively trying to 
implement them through its financial regulation and funding practices.168 
In contrast to both ECNL and Euclid, the EFC/Cordaid/SBF joint dec-
laration seeks to eliminate the Commission from the non-profit regulato-
                                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 3. 
 164. Response to Consultation Paper from European Commission, supra note 156, at 
3. 
 165. ECNL Comments, supra note 160, at 3. 
 166. Id. at 4. 
 167. Id. 
 168. EUCLID NETWORK, supra note 44. 
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ry picture entirely.169 In this regard, these comments are consistent with 
EFC’s earlier responses to the 2005 Framework Code of Conduct.170 
Dismissing the basis for the guidelines as ill founded, these organizations 
argue that the improvement of non-profit management and governance 
should be left to non-profits, their support organizations, and networks.171 
The uncompromising wording of the joint declaration leaves little room 
for the Commission to play any regulatory role in relation to the sector. 
According to its signatories, it is for Member States (rather than the EU) 
to maintain an open dialogue and to cooperate with non-profit organiza-
tions in any review of the scope and impact of FATF SR VIII. The only 
mention of the Commission in this context is a preemptive warning to it 
not to add to the regulatory burdens already borne by non-profits in the 
implementation of the Stockholm Programme.172 The Humanitarian Fo-
rum also queries the rationale for the guidelines, asking in what specific 
respects existing charity law and regulation in EU Member States is per-
ceived as inadequate for the task of combating the financing of terror-
ism.173 
All of the submissions seen by the author urge the Commission to re-
draft the guidance in more precise and consistent terms with greater ap-
preciation of the intended non-profit audience174 and the roles played by 
that audience (whether grant-making or programmatic). In this regard, 
ECNL highlights certain inconsistencies in the draft that result in an ap-
parently non-binding measure implying in some of its provisions that 
                                                                                                                                     
 169. Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper, supra note 155, at 2. 
 170. See EFC, Comments on the Discussion Document, “Draft Recommendations to 
Member States Regarding a Code of Conduct for Non-Profit Organisations to Promote 
Transparency and Accountability Best Practices: An EU Design for Implementation of 
FATF Special Recommendation VIII—Non-profit Organisations,” (2005), available at 
http://www.efc.be/EUAdvocacy/Documents/2005_EFCCommentsJAI_Code.pdf. 
 171. See Joint Comments on the Discussion Paper, supra note 155, at 2. 
 172. Id. at 2 (calling “on the Commission and EU Member States to ensure that any 
initiative, as part of the implementation of the Stockholm programme action plan, does 
not lead to new layers of rules and red tape or introduce unrealistic regulatory provisions 
and/or financial obstacles, which would hinder the sector’s ability to perform vital work 
on behalf of its beneficiaries in Europe and beyond, including NPOs that work in conflict 
zones”). 
 173. Response to Consultation Paper from European Commission, supra note 156, at 
1. 
 174. The ECNL Comments are particularly strong in this regard in seeking that the 
Commission clarify its intended target audience as being either all non-profits or merely 
public benefit/charitable organizations with clearer distinctions being drawn between the 
standards expected of both big and small non-profits and those non-profits engaged in 
grant-making as opposed to direct programme delivery. ECNL Comments, supra note 
160, at 5–6. 
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non-profits “should do” certain actions, stating in others what non-profits 
“must do,” while declaring in yet further provisions what non-profits 
“will do.”175 The Humanitarian Forum submission takes the Commission 
to task for its vague references to required higher standards and better 
practices that should be followed by non-profits.176 It points out that to 
encourage non-profits to “adopt practices in addition to those required by 
law that provide additional assurances that all assets are used exclusively 
for charitable or other legitimate purposes” is not helpful when the 
Commission does not outline the nature of these practices.177 Similarly, 
in an EU system that does not have a recognized or harmonized system 
of accounting procedures, a requirement that non-profits follow “proper 
book-keeping practice” in paragraph 2.3.1 of the draft Guidelines with-
out further elaboration does not lead to greater clarity. Such equivocation 
has adverse consequences for non-profits, according to Humanitarian 
Forum, since it forces them to guess what is meant and how particular 
guidelines will be applied in practice, with resulting “confusion, over-
caution and unnecessary expense—or confused disinterest” on the part of 
affected organizations.178 
As to the next steps, if the Commission heeds the responses received to 
date, it will need to substantially revise its guidelines and to engage in 
wider public consultation in advance of proceeding with its proposed 
Communication in 2011. One must hope that ECNL’s expressed confi-
dence in due process is well placed179 and that, in contrast to previous 
occasions, sufficient time will be allocated for effective public consulta-
tion. 
VI. THE WAY FORWARD: TAKING WISDOM WHERE ONE FINDS IT 
Legitimacy and public integrity are vital to [non-profit organizations] 
and are essential to the effectiveness of their mission . . . . As transpar-
ency and accountability are demanded of NGOs, however, the same 
transparency and accountability are needed from governments . . . . Of-
                                                                                                                                     
 175. Id. at 8 (referring respectively to paragraphs 2.1.6, 2.1.4 and 2.1.1. in the Guide-
lines). 
 176. See Response to Consultation Paper from European Commission, supra note 156, 
at 2. 
 177. DG Home Voluntary Guidelines, supra note 133, ¶ 2.1.3. 
 178. Response to Consultation Paper from European Commission, supra note 156. 
 179. The ECNL Comments go so far as to say that ECNL “is aware that wider consul-
tations are planned for once the current draft is revised.” ECNL Comments, supra note 
160, at 6. At the time of writing, there is still no public reference to the Discussion Paper 
on DG Home Affairs webpage. 
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ficials who make public claims and establish policies on the basis of al-
leged NGO associations with terrorism have a responsibility to justify 
such assertions. Responsible NGOs should not be made to invest re-
sources in proving their bona fides in the absence of legitimate charges 
or verifiable evidence.180 
There is much truth in the old adage—it’s not what you do, it’s the 
way that you do it. NGOs play many important roles in the European 
Union: from policy advisors to policy advocates. They act as valuable 
conduits between the institutions and the citizenry in areas ranging from 
direct service provision to grassroots involvement and both help to give 
voice to pluralist agendas as well as providing a focal point for bringing 
common interests together. In as much as they play an important part in 
dispelling the democratic deficit in the EU, it is also important to shine a 
bright light on their involvement, thereby ensuring it is carried out with 
integrity. Institutional concern to ensure such good governance would 
indeed be a welcome starting point. 
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, the institutional concern spearhead-
ing the current move towards European regulation of non-profits is driv-
en less by governance concerns and far more by combating the financing 
of terrorism. It is inevitable that this latter prevailing circumstance will 
colour any resulting policy solution. As the Commission’s own reports 
have shown, to adopt this approach is to put the cart before the horse. 
Arguably, it would be far better to focus on improving the governance of 
EU-based non-profits in those areas that either raise concern at EU level 
or may benefit from a European as opposed to an ad hoc Member State 
approach. As the Independent Scrutiny Report showed, a direct focus on 
better governance will reap many indirect benefits that will assist in 
combating the financing of terrorism. Examples of both models currently 
exist in the form of the United States Treasury Guidelines (an anti-
terrorism model) and the recommendations on NGO Governance from 
the Council of Europe’s Conference on International NGOs (a govern-
ance model). 
In revising its Voluntary Guidelines, the European Commission may 
choose to place ongoing emphasis on the need for effective counter-
terrorism measures in the non-profit sector at European level, even 
though, as non-profit organizations are quick to point out, the ‘fit’ is not 
good. The fear for many non-profits may be that the Commission will be 
overly influenced by the United States’ policy in this area, a policy that 
has drawn vociferous criticism from charities, human-rights watchdogs, 
                                                                                                                                     
 180. DAVID CORTRIGHT ET AL., FRIEND NOT FOE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM 17 (2008). 
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and scholars since its introduction in 2002.181 The policy, contained with-
in the United States Department of Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing 
Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities,182 mirrors 
in structure the Commission’s draft Code of Conduct, with guidance on 
fundamental principles of good charitable practice, governance account-
ability and transparency, financial accountability and transparency, pro-
gramme verification, and anti-terrorist financing best practices, respec-
tively. 
In force since 2002, these guidelines were revised in 2006 and supple-
mented by a risk matrix in 2007.183 These revisions have not addressed 
the concerns of US charities, which, in response to the guidelines, devel-
oped alternative principles of best practice for international charities in 
2005.184 Of particular concern to European based non-profits will be the 
‘know your donor/know your beneficiary’ provisions, a principle that 
USAID has given effect to through its unpopular ‘partner vetting sys-
tem,’185 and one that remains of concern to EU-based nonprofits in terms 
of the Commission’s intentions in this regard. 
                                                                                                                                     
 181. See Nancy Billica, Political Scientist, Univ. Colorado, & Advisor to Urgent Ac-
tion Fund for Women, Remarks at Panel Discussion: Safeguarding Charity in the War on 
Terror, Georgetown University Center for Public & Nonprofit Leadership (June 14, 
2005), available at http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Charity061405.pdf; see also 
Mark Sidel, Counter-Terrorism and the Enabling Legal and Political Environment for 
Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of “War on Terror” States, 10 INT’L J. NON-
PROFIT L. 7, 13–14 (2008); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [ACLU], BLOCKING FAITH, 
FREEZING CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE “WAR ON TERRORISM 
FINANCING” (2009) [hereinafter ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY]; Mark 
Sidel, Counter-terrorism and the Regulation of Civil Society in the USA, 41 DEV. 
CHANGE 293 (2010) [hereinafter Sidel, Counter-terrorism]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Response to Comments Submitted on the U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/response.pdf (responding to criticisms of the Guidelines). 
 182. ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUIDELINES, supra note 161. 
 183. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY’S OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, RISK 
MATRIX FOR THE CHARITABLE SECTOR (2007), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/policy/charity_risk_matrix.pdf. 
 184. TREASURY GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP OF CHARITABLE SECTOR ORGS.& 
ADVISORS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (2005), available at 
http://www.independentsector.org/uploads/Policy_PDFs/CharityPrinciples.pdf; see also 
Sidel, Counter-terrorism, supra note 181, at 299 (documenting the charity/Treasury im-
passe on the primacy of the conflicting guidelines that still existed in 2009). 
 185. See Issue Brief: USAID Must Consider Alternative Vetting Approaches, CHARITY 
& SEC. NETWORK, 
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Issue%20Brief_USAID_Alternative_Vetting
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To be sure, the Commission stands in a much weaker position than the 
Department of Treasury in the US when it comes to implementing effec-
tively any such code. The worst-case scenario for non-profits would be 
the introduction of an ill-conceived ‘voluntary’ European code of con-
duct that draws half-hearted support from Member State governments 
and is indiscriminately applied to non-profit organizations both by EU 
institutions, Member States, and third country governments in which 
some of these non-profit organizations operate. The effect of such appli-
cation would be to burden compliant NGOs with an additional layer of 
bureaucracy, and if issued in its current form, cause confusion amongst 
NGOs as to what is actually required of them under the guidelines, lead-
ing in some cases to inevitable self censorship or restriction of humani-
tarian work in high risk areas. The absence of a centralised European 
oversight schema will also make it difficult to apply the code in an even-
handed manner to all non-profits, resulting (again in a worst case scenar-
io) in certain types of organizations being subjected to scrutiny under the 
code (for instance, Muslim charities) with others escaping entirely under 
the radar.186 
A better outcome for non-profits would be for the EU Commission to 
play to its strengths and to use its fulcrum position to act as a facilitator 
of information exchange and best practice for European non-profits. 
Again, achievement of this role is not something that can be accom-
plished overnight. As all the reports commissioned by the Commission 
over the past five years have demonstrated, effective and proportional 
regulatory action is only possible when it is based upon sound empirical 
research.187 To this end, it may be worth learning from the practices of 
                                                                                                                                     
_Approaches (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) (describing the PVS as creating “unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous barriers for humanitarian groups providing relief in global hot 
spots”). 
 186. In this regard, consider the disproportionate effect that the anti-terrorist financing 
guidelines in the United States has had on Muslim charities. For a discussion, see ACLU, 
BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY, supra note 181. 
 187. A recent DG Home invitation to tender to conduct a feasibility study on mapping 
out which actors and through which tools and steps could create a non-profit organisation 
observatory in the EU is thus a welcome step in the direction. See Commission Service 
Contract Notice 387044-2010, B-Brussels, Feasibility Study on Mapping Out Which Ac-
tors, and Through Which Tools and Steps, Could Create a Non-Profit Organisations 
Observatory in the EU, OJ S252/2010, available at 
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:387044-2010:TEXT:EN:HTML. The tender 
process closes in mid-February 2011 and ten months is allocated for the project’s com-
pletion upon award, meaning the Commission should have better information on hand by 
early 2012. Of course, this date is still substantially later than the Commission’s adver-
tised 2011 date for the release of its proposed Communication on the Non-Profit Code of 
Conduct. 
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the Council of Europe (the “CoE”) in light of its recent forays into the 
area of NGO governance and best practice. 
Founded in 1949, the CoE is Europe’s oldest political organization and 
comprises forty-seven members, which includes all Member States of the 
EU.188 The Council was established to achieve greater European unity 
through the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, 
and to develop common responses to political, social, cultural, and legal 
challenges in Member States.189 The CoE and the EU enjoy good politi-
cal relations, which were further strengthened in 2007, when the two en-
tered into a Memorandum of Understanding that provided for a new 
framework for enhanced co-operation and political dialogue.190 In terms 
of impact, the CoE is perceived as an intergovernmental structure whose 
decisions have relatively little impact on social and economic redistribu-
tion in Europe when compared to EU decisions.191 Conventions promul-
gated by the CoE are non-binding since the CoE cannot impose ratifica-
tion except in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Equally, CoE recommendations are not legally binding on either an in-
ternational or national level.192 However, in practice, Member States do 
bear them in mind when developing related legislation. Since the CoE 
cannot sanction violations by Member States, the CoE must work 
through the cajoling of governments and the encouragement of best prac-
tice.193 To this end, the general influence of the CoE outside of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights mirrors the current influence of the 
EU Commission in the area of European non-profit regulation. 
At the heart of the CoE lies a quadrilogue of institutions: the Commit-
tee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Congress of Local and 
                                                                                                                                     
 188. Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Apr. 7, 
2011). 
 189. Mission Statement, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/soc-
sp/general_information/02_mission_statement/MISSION%20STATEMENT.asp (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2011). 
 190. Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the European 
Union, CM (2007) 74 (May 10, 2007). Core areas of cooperation between the two cur-
rently include: human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, justice and home 
affairs, fight against organized crime and corruption, culture, education, and other joint 
activities. 
 191. Silke M. Trommer & Raj S. Chari, The Council of Europe: Interest Groups and 
Ideological Missions?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 665, 666 (2006). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Matti Niemivuo, Good Administration and the Council of Europe, 14 EUR. PUB. 
L. 545, 545–46 (2008). 
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Regional Authorities, and the Conference of International NGOs (the 
“Conference”). Together, these actors actively participate in the policies 
and work programme of the CoE and reinforce co-operation between the 
CoE and the various associations in Member States. Since the introduc-
tion of participatory status for INGOs in 2003,194 the Conference has 
been in a stronger position to influence policy development at the Com-
mittee of Ministers. 
In 2008, the Conference established an Expert Council on NGO Law 
(the “Expert Council”), the task of which is “to contribute to the creation 
of an enabling environment for NGOs throughout Europe by examining 
national NGO law and its implementation, and promoting its compatibil-
ity with Council of Europe standards and European good practice.”195 
The Expert Council has published two reports to date: its first report un-
dertook a thematic study on the conditions for the establishment of 
NGOs with case studies of six countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, France, 
Italy, Russia, and Slovakia.196 In its second report, published in January 
2010, the Expert Council turned its attention to the internal governance 
of NGOs and examined the scope for self-governance, supervision and 
intervention by authorities, accountability and transparency, manage-
ment, and decision-making processes. This report included case studies 
of Armenia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Moldova, and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia,197 along with less detailed descriptions of prac-
tice in other CoE Member States based on the return of country ques-
tionnaires. 
The Expert Council’s recommendations, which were endorsed by the 
Conference of INGOs in January 2010, call on Member States to ensure, 
inter alia, that the scope of obligations relating to the auditing of ac-
counts and reporting on activities is clarified and does not place an undue 
                                                                                                                                     
 194. Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., Participatory Status for International Non-
Governmental Organisations with the Council of Europe, Res (2003) 8 (Nov. 19, 2003). 
Prior to 2003, NGOs enjoyed a lesser form of “consultative status” with the CoE. 
 195. Conference of INGOs of the Council of Eur., Expert Council on NGO Law Terms 
of Reference, OINGConf/Exp (2008) 1 (Jan. 2008). 
 196. Conference of INGOs of the Council of Eur., Expert Council on NGO Law, First 
Annual Report: Conditions of Establishment of Non-Governmental Organisations, 
OINGConf/Exp 2009 1 (Jan. 2009). The Conference of INGOs adopted this report on 
January 28, 2009, and made a series of recommendations regarding its implementation. 
See Conference of INGOs of the Council of Eur., First Report of the Expert Council on 
NGO Law, CONF/PLE (2009) REC 1 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
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burden on NGOs.198 It points out that the basis for public authorities to 
challenge the decision-making of NGOs should be limited to circum-
stances in which there is a legitimate public interest to be protected.199 
Furthermore, the report argues that the appropriate sanction against 
NGOs for breach of legal requirements applicable to them should merely 
be the requirement to rectify their affairs and/or the imposition of an ad-
ministrative, civil, or criminal penalty on them and/or any individuals 
directly responsible.200 Clarity and proportionality are thus the keywords 
here. 
This emphasis on institutional clarity and proportionality can also be 
seen in the CoE Recommendation (2007) 14 on the legal status of non-
governmental organizations in Europe.201 The Recommendation requires, 
inter alia, that the activities of NGOs should be presumed to be lawful in 
the absence of contrary evidence and that no external intervention in the 
running of NGOs should take place unless a serious breach of the legal 
requirements applicable to NGOs has been established or is reasonably 
believed to be imminent.202 These principles give effect to the underlying 
legitimacy of non-profit organizations and require that any impediments 
to their operations be based on a sound legal basis. 
At present, the work of the Expert Council on NGO Law is producing 
empirically sound accounts of European Member State NGO law and 
practice, thus assisting in the establishment of common trends of best 
practices and common problems. If the essence of these principles were 
to inform the European Commission in its relations with non-profit or-
ganizations and in the drafting of its voluntary code of conduct, a better 
outcome would be assured in achieving stronger NGO accountability and 
transparency through better governance while simultaneously, albeit in-
directly, supporting the anti-terrorism agenda without undermining the 
achievement of non-profits’ missions. 
                                                                                                                                     
 198. Conference of INGOs of the Council of Eur., Internal Governance of NGOs, 
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of Non-Governmental Organisations in Europe]. Compare the approach of the Expert 
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